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"A student's right to criticize his or her teachers is a right secured by
the Constitution."
Imagine a high school junior class secretary seeking to ensure the
school's annual music festival happens. After being rescheduled three times,
the principal informs her the music festival needs to be rescheduled again.
Later that night, the junior class secretary posts a blog entry imploring
community members and taxpayers to contact the principal in support of
keeping the music festival as scheduled. She posts this blog entry from home
and refers to school administrators as the "douchebags in central office."2
Imagine a middle school student that creates a parody profile of his
principal on MySpace. The student creates this online speech while he is at
home. He uses words like "fagass," "fucking," "dick head," and "bitch" in
the profile.I
In both cases, the schools punished the students for their online speech
because it was offensive and related to the school, even though no substantial
disruption occurred at school. Is offensive, online student speech subject to
school jurisdiction? Should it be? Should it matter whether online speech is
created or accessed on or off campus?
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet considered
whether schools have jurisdiction over online student speech, its
opportunity may be fast approaching. 4 On February 4, 2010, two different
1. Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1283 (W.D. Wash.
2007).
2. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 203, 206 (D. Conn. 2007), aff'd,
527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). On remand, the district court certified
two questions to the Second Circuit, which are still pending. Doninger v. Niehoff, No.
3:07CV1129 (MRK), 2009 WL 1364890 (D. Conn. May 14, 2009).
3. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 290-91 (3d Cir. Feb. 4,
2010), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010); see also
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 252-53 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010)
(concerning high school student who created a "parody profile" of his principal on
MySpace), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 07-4465 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
4. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48 ("The Supreme Court has yet to speak on
the scope of a school's authority to regulate expression that . . . does not occur on
school grounds or at a school-sponsored event."); Clay Calvert, Punishing Public
School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers & Classmates in Cyberspace: The
Speech Issue the Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 210,
214, 216 (2009) (noting the Court has not yet considered whether school jurisdiction
over online, off-campus student speech violates First Amendment rights).
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Third Circuit panels issued decisions directly addressing school jurisdiction
over online, off-campus student speech.' On April 9, 2010, the Third
Circuit vacated both opinions and granted a consolidated en banc
rehearing to resolve the contradictory results reached by the two different
Third Circuit panels.6 Oral arguments occurred on June 3, 2010.1 Another
case involving online, off-campus student speech is currently before the
Second Circuit on a certified question concerning school jurisdiction over
offensive online student speech that is created off campus.8 All three cases
address whether Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser9 applies to online,
off-campus student speech.10 Doctrinal analysis and a close reading of
recent student speech cases involving Fraser demonstrate the erosion of
sound precedent through the continued expansion of a school's disciplinary
jurisdiction over online speech. This expanded assertion of school
jurisdiction beyond the schoolhouse gate undermines core First
Amendment rights and values by restricting students' speech rights and is
not supported by Fraser.
Chronologically, Fraser is the second of four Supreme Court student
speech cases."1 Fraser is an exception to the Court's first and seminal
student speech case: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District.12 In Tinker, the Court held that a school could not regulate
student speech unless it could foreseeably cause a substantial disruption of
5. See Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d at 303; Layshock, 593 F.3d at 263.
6. Blue Mountain, No. 08-4138, slip op. at 1; Layshock, No. 07-4465, slip op.
at 1.
7. Blue Mountain, No. 08-4138, slip op. at 1; Layshock, No. 07-4465, slip op.
at 2.
8. Doninger v. Niehoff, No. 09-1452-cv(L) (2d Cir. 2009) (two certified
questions are currently pending before the Second Circuit); see also Doninger v.
Niehoff, No. 3:07CV1129 (MRK), 2009 WL 1364890 (D. Conn. May 14, 2009)
(certifying two questions to the Second Circuit).
9. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
10. See Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d at 299; Layshock, 593 F.3d at 256-58;
Doninger, 527 F.3d at 49.
11. The cases are: Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (holding
schools may punish speech that could reasonably be interpreted as advocating illegal
drug use); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding a
school may punish school-sponsored student speech when such regulation is reasonably
related to the school's legitimate pedagogical concerns); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
12. Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d at 312 (Chagares, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (describing Fraser as an "exception" to Tinker).
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the school environment." Fraser is an exception to Tinker because it did
not overrule Tinker and allows a school to regulate student speech, even
absent a substantial disruption.14 The Fraser Court held that a school could
punish a student for a giving a speech filled with sexual innuendo at a
mandatory school assembly because it considered the speech "offensively
lewd and indecent."" Twenty-one years after Fraser, the Supreme Court
stated, "The mode of analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear."16
The recent cases in the Second and Third Circuits demonstrate
uncertainty as to whether Fraser applies to online, off-campus speech. In
Layshock v. Hermitage School District, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania found the school violated the
student's First Amendment rights because Fraser does not apply to online,
off-campus speech." In J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania reached the
opposite conclusion, finding the school did not violate the student's First
Amendment rights because Fraser is applicable to online, off-campus
speech. 8 On the respective appeals, the Third Circuit did not resolve the
intra-circuit split between Layshock and Blue Mountain.
The Third Circuit Layshock panel unanimously affirmed the district
court opinion, holding Fraser does not apply to online, off-campus speech.19
In Blue Mountain, a different Third Circuit panel failed to resolve the split
because the majority declined to decide if Fraser applies to online, off-
campus speech.20 The Blue Mountain majority affirmed the lower court's
decision that the school did not violate the student's First Amendment
rights based on Tinker, not Fraser.21 The majority reasoned the school had
jurisdiction to punish the student's online, off-campus speech under Tinker
because the speech could reasonably be forecasted to cause a substantial
13. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14.
14. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
15. Id.
16. Morse, 551 U.S. at 404.
17. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599-600 (W.D.
Pa. 2007), affd, 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No.
07-4465 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
18. See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at
*6-7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), affd, 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010), vacated, reh'g
en banc granted, No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
19. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 260-61, 261 n.16.
20. Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d at 301.
21. Id.
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disruption of the school environment. 22 The Third Circuit reached this
holding even though it agreed with the district court that the record failed
to establish an actual substantial disruption occurred. 23
One Blue Mountain judge dissented, stating Fraser does not apply to
online, off-campus speech and criticizing the majority for conflating Fraser
and Tinker.24 Although Layshock and Blue Mountain did not create an
express intra-circuit split, they left uncertainty as to when schools possess
jurisdiction over offensive, online student speech.25 Even though the
Layshock panel applied Fraser and the Blue Mountain panel ostensibly
applied Tinker, these Third Circuit decisions seem to contradict each
other.26 In its consolidated en banc rehearing, the Third Circuit has an
opportunity to reduce this uncertainty and ensure First Amendment rights
of students and others are fully protected in the context of online speech.
In Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit declined to decide whether
Fraser applies to online, off-campus speech but affirmed the lower court
22. Id. at 290.
23. Id. at 299 ("Were we examining the facts merely for evidence of a
'substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities' that had
already taken place, we would have no trouble concluding, as the District Court did,
that these incidents did not amount to a substantial disruption of the Middle School
sufficient to discipline the students for their speech." (citing Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969))). Blue Mountain School District
offered the following evidence, which was rejected by both the district court and the
Third Circuit because it failed to establish an actual substantial disruption: (1) two
teachers quieting their classes that were discussing the online speech; (2) a counselor
proctoring an exam so the administrator originally assigned to proctor the exam could
attend a meeting regarding the online speech; and (3) two students decorating the
lockers of the online speakers, as well as students congregating in the hallway, when
the suspended students returned from their suspensions. Id. at 293-94.
24. Id. at 317 (Chagares, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[The
majority's holding] sounds like an application of the Fraser standard rather than the
Tinker standard.").
25. Eric Goldman, Third Circuit Schizophrenia over Student Discipline for
Fake MySpace Profiles, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Feb. 7, 2010, 9:05 AM),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/print_001745.html ("[T]he Third Circuit's
dichotomous rulings create a lot of uncertainty that will lead to more frequent, longer-
lasting and unproductive court battles over [online student speech].").
26. Shannon P. Duffy, Do 3rd Circuit Rulings over Student Speech on
MySpace Pages Contradict?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 5, 2010, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202442025383&pos=ataglance (explaining the
Third Circuit "has confounded the prognosticators by handing down a pair of decisions
on the same day that reached opposite results").
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judgment denying the student's preliminary injunction motion.27 In a
subsequent suit for damages against school officials, the United States
District Court of Connecticut found Fraser does apply to online, off-
campus speech.28 Doninger is currently pending on a certified question
before the Second Circuit to determine if Fraser applies to offensive,
online, off-campus speech.29 Because lower courts are in "disarray" when
defining school jurisdiction over online student speech,3 0 the issue is ripe
for Supreme Court review.31
For decades, courts have struggled with balancing the competing
interests of students' First Amendment rights and schools' rights to
regulate the school environment. 32 Online speech is a relatively new factor
that must be considered when balancing these competing interests. Not
only are lower court decisions in disarray as to the limits of school
jurisdiction over online student speech, legal commentary also exhibits
27. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49-50, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2008).
28. Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 221 (D. Conn. 2009) ("It is true
that the Second Circuit declined to decide whether Fraser applied to off-campus speech
in the context of an extracurricular activity. But given that this Court has already
decided this issue, unless and until the Second Circuit rules otherwise, the Court does
not believe there is any reason to change its position that Ms. Doninger's First
Amendment rights were not violated when she was told that she could not run for class
secretary because of an offensive blog entry that was clearly designed to come on to
campus and influence fellow students.").
29. Supplemental Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 1-2,
Doninger v. Niehoff, Nos. 09-1452-cv(L), 09-1601-cv(XAP), 09-2261-cv(CON) (2d Cir.
Aug. 28, 2009).
30. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 224 ("'[W]hen it comes to student cyber-
speech, the lower courts are in complete disarray, handing down ad hoc decisions that,
even when they reach an instinctively correct conclusion, lack consistent, controlling
legal principles."' (quoting Kenneth R. Pike, Locating the Mislaid Gate: Revitalizing
Tinker by Repairing Judicial Overgeneralizations of Technologically Enabled Student
Speech, 2008 BYU L. REV. 971, 990 (2008))).
31. Duffy, supra note 26 ("Attorney Anthony G. Sanchez, the losing defense
lawyer in the Layshock case, said he believes the issue is ripe for review by the U.S.
Supreme Court because the lower courts are struggling with a framework of student-
speech jurisprudence that was laid down in the late 1960s and early 1970s."); see
Calvert, supra note 4, at 212-13 (recognizing there are jurisdictional and substantive
issues the "lower courts are grappling with" as a result of off-campus, technology-
assisted expression).
32. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 311 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010)
(Chagares, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the court's struggle "to
strike a balance between safeguarding students' First Amendment rights and
protecting the authority of school administrators" since the days of Tinker), vacated,
reh'g en banc granted, No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
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uncertainty as to these limits.33
As online student speech doctrine develops through the courts, some
parties and amici are reaching common ground. At least some parties and
amici agree Tinker's substantial disruption test applies to online, off-
campus speech when that speech causes, or is reasonably forecasted to
cause, a substantial disruption in the school environment. 34 But what about
school jurisdiction over offensively lewd or indecent online speech that
does not cause a substantial disruption? Do schools have jurisdiction over
online Fraser-type speech? 35 Does it matter if online Fraser-type speech
occurs on or off campus? Are geographic, physical demarcations useful for
drawing jurisdictional limits of school authority over online student
speech?
Schools seek to extend jurisdiction over online, off-campus speech by
relying on language in Fraser concerning schools' rights to inculcate values
of civility in children.3 6 While schools have a role in inculcating values of
33. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 223-24 (stating "even a cursory review of
legal commentary shows" school jurisdiction over online student speech is still
unclear).
34. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 514. F. Supp. 2d 199, 218-20 (D. Conn.
2007) (considering the student's argument the Tinker test applied to her blog post
created off campus during nonschool hours, but determining no substantial disruption
occurred on campus), ajd, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008); Amicus Curiae Brief in Support
of the Cross-Appellant, Avery Doninger at 4, Doninger, 527 F.3d 41 (Nos. 09-1452-
cv(L), 09-1601-cv(XAP), 09-2261-cv(CON)), available at http://www.acluct.org
/downloads/DoningerAmicus09.pdf (agreeing that the Tinker test applies to off-campus
speech when it could cause a substantial disruption to the school environment). But see
Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d at 313 n.15 (Chagares, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("The question of whether Tinker's 'substantial disruption' standard applies to
off-campus speech in the first place is not settled."); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student
Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1092 (2008) ("The application
of Tinker's materially and substantially disruptive standard to all digital speech is also a
tempting but ultimately unsatisfying approach.").
35. For purposes of this Article, "Fraser-type speech" means offensively lewd
or indecent speech involving sexual content. See infra Part II.A, notes 40 & 97 and
accompanying text (supporting this definition).
36. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); cf Brief
of Appellee, Blue Mountain School District at 7, Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d 286 (No. 08-
4138) (arguing the school district can discipline a student based on an offensive online
parody profile because it has an "effect on the school and the educational mission of
the [d]istrict"); Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 11, Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist., 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 07-4465, 07-4555) ("'Public education ... must
inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to
happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community
2010] 103
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civility, that role alone cannot provide Fraser-jurisdiction over off-campus
speech, online or offline. Such an interpretation of Fraser would permit
school jurisdiction over student speech wherever it occurs and whenever
the school finds the content uncivil, without due regard for students' First
Amendment rights.37 Students and their parents,38 and amici like the
Student Press Law Center and the ACLU, advocate a narrower reading of
Fraser that precludes school jurisdiction over online speech. 3
Fraser holds that three factors are important for schools to assert
jurisdiction over student speech: (1) there must be a captive audience; (2)
the speech must involve lewd or indecent sexual content; and (3) the school
must have a need to disassociate itself from the speech. 40 Because there is
no captive audience in cyberspace and a school is not reasonably associated
with a student's online speech, schools do not have jurisdiction over online
Fraser-type speech. This rule applies regardless of whether the online
speech is created or accessed on or off campus. The border of school
jurisdiction over online Fraser-type speech is not geographical; it is a
border between real space and cyberspace. Fraser and its progeny support
this legal rule. The online nature of the speech does not provide a basis for
schools to expand Fraser-jurisdiction beyond the schoolhouse gate into
cyberspace.
A bright-line rule that schools do not have jurisdiction over Fraser-
type speech in cyberspace is more than a mere logical application of Fraser.
and the nation."' (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681)).
37. Cf Supplemental Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, note 29, at
37-42 (arguing Fraser does not apply to an online, off-campus blog post).
38. E.g., Brief of Appellants at 35-36, Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d 286 (No. 08-
4138) (noting Justice Blackmun's Fraser concurrence makes clear the school could not
punish Fraser for giving the same speech outside the school environment).
39. Brief of Amicus Curiae Student Press Law Center in Support of Plaintiff-
Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 7, Doninger v. Niehoff, Nos. 09-1452-cv(L), 09-1601-
cv(XAP), 09-2261-cv(CON) ("[W]here student speech occurs off campus, the fact that
it may be considered offensive does not provide a constitutionally valid reason for
regulating or punishing it." (citations omitted)).
40. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684-86. Courts disagree as to whether Fraser is limited
to lewd and indecent sexual speech or whether it applies to other categories of
offensive speech. Resolving this dispute is beyond the scope of this Article because the
captive-audience and need-to-disassociate factors preclude school jurisdiction over
online speech, regardless of whether Fraser is limited to lewd or indecent speech.
While acknowledging the existence of this split of authority, this Article takes the
position that Fraser is limited to lewd or indecent speech based on the Court's
reasoning in that case. See infra Part II.A, note 97 and accompanying text for further
analysis.
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Normative reasons support limiting school jurisdiction over online student
speech. Schools concededly encroach on students' First Amendment rights
when students enter the school environment. Since Tinker, the Supreme
Court has continually eroded students' free speech rights.4 1 That erosion
has rapidly increased with schools asserting jurisdiction over online student
speech and lower courts upholding that jurisdiction.42 Additionally, school
administrators sometimes impose excessive punishments, especially when
they are the subject of the online speech.43 Incursion on free speech rights
should be as narrow as possible because speech is an inherent part of an
individual's development and quest for identity.
Self-realization theory helps maintain robust protection of free
speech rights guaranteed under the Constitution.44 A school should not be
permitted to punish a student engaging in online political speech merely
because she uses the term "douchebag." Just as the First Amendment
tolerates some false speech to ensure true speech is not lost, the First
Amendment tolerates online student speech that schools may reasonably
find offensive to ensure valuable speech is not lost.45 Nor should a school
be permitted to punish a student who creates an online parody profile of a
school administrator merely because it finds the profile offensive and
41. Clay Calvert, Tinker's Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed but Still
Standing, 58 AM. U. L. REv. 1167, 1190 (2009) (noting although Tinker has been
eroded, it is not dead); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 417-18 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the Supreme Court has "scaled back" Tinker and
continues to make student-speech rules on an "ad hoc basis"). Justice Thomas went on
to state, "I join the Court's opinion because it erodes Tinker's hold in the realm of
student speech, even though it does so by adding to the patchwork of exceptions to the
Tinker standard." Id. at 422.
42. See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 604-05
(W.D. Pa. 2007) (holding policies that required students to express their ideas in a
respectful manner and refrain from verbal abuse were not overbroad), affd, 593 F.3d
249 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 07-4465 (3d Cir. Apr. 9,
2010).
43. See, e.g., id. at 593-94 (noting the student received a ten-day out-of-school
suspension, as well as additional discipline that included a ban from extracurricular
activities and a prohibition from participating in the high school graduation ceremony,
after creating unflattering profiles of his principal on MySpace).
44. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593
(1982) (discussing self-realization as an overall First Amendment theory); see also infra
Part IV.
45. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-73 (1964) (discussing
how some false speech is constitutionally protected to avoid the chilling effect of self-
censorship).
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valueless.46 Schools are not keepers of the public mind.47 Protecting online
student speech is important-regardless of whether it involves political
speech or merely offensive, juvenile humor-because it helps avoid the
chilling effect on free speech 48 and protects the value of self-realization. 49
Such protection is especially important in our diverse and pluralistic
country50where we recognize "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.""
Part II establishes that children have First Amendment rights and
Supreme Court doctrine consistently limits school jurisdiction to student
46. This Article focuses on speech that may be offensive but does not cause a
substantial disruption in the school environment or rise to the level of other
unprotected speech, such as defamation, a true threat, or one of the few other
categories of unprotected speech.
47. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 286 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
48. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Indeed,
we have granted First Amendment protection to much speech of questionable worth,
rather than force potential speakers to determine at their peril if words are embraced
within the protected zone.").
49. Redish, supra note 44, at 593.
50. See, e.g., JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, CREON'S GHOST: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE
HUMANITIES 19 (2009) ("[P]articularly in a modem pluralistic democracy, we
acknowledge and accept the existence and value of moral and political disagreement.
We acknowledge that society is comprised of a variety of political, moral, and religious
points of view. We are committed to toleration and endorse the idea that there can be
no single moral viewpoint that can or should take precedence over others.").
51. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). The Supreme Court held that
Cohen had a First Amendment right to wear a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft"
in a courthouse. Id. at 16-17, 26. "[B]ecause governmental officials cannot make
principled distinctions in this area . .. the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style
... largely to the individual." Id. at 25; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
770 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Plarents, not the government, have the right to
make certain decisions regarding the upbringing of their children. As surprising as it
may be to individual Members of this Court, some parents may actually find Mr.
Carlin's unabashed attitude towards the seven 'dirty words' healthy, and deem it
desirable to expose their children to the manner in which Mr. Carlin defuses the taboo
surrounding the words. Such parents may constitute a minority of the American
public, but the absence of great numbers willing to exercise the right to raise their
children in this fashion does not alter the right's nature or its existence. Only the
Court's regrettable decision does that."). These insights about the limits of
government action against free speech are particularly relevant in the context of
schools that discipline students for offensive, online student speech that is critical of the
school or school administrators. When school administrators are the subject of the
critical speech, it is even more difficult for them to be objective about whether and how
much punishment should be imposed. See infra Part IV.B.
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speech that occurs on campus, at school-sponsored events, or that causes a
substantial disruption of the school environment. Online, Fraser-type
speech is outside the scope of these categories, and cyberlaw commentary
supports creating a jurisdictional border between cyberspace and the
physical world. 52  Part III demonstrates caselaw applying Fraser-
Layshock, Blue Mountain, and Doninger, for example-supports
precluding school jurisdiction over online, Fraser-type student speech. Part
IV sets forth self-realization theory as a normative basis for limiting school
jurisdiction over online student speech rights. While self-realization is not
the dominant First Amendment theory, it appears in a variety of First
Amendment Supreme Court cases, most recently in Justice Stevens's
dissenting opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.5 3
Beyond its role in Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence, self-
realization has special relevance for online student speech because of the
importance of cyberspace in the lives of today's youth.5 4
II. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
While there is broad agreement on the importance of free speech
rights, there is little agreement on an overall theory of the First
Amendment,55 although there is near-universal agreement that it protects
52. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1378-80 (1996).
53. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (noting free speech "facilitates the value of 'individual
self-realization"' (quoting Redish, supra note 44, at 594)).
54. See Papandrea, supra note 34, at 1030, 1034. "The importance of these
new [digital] technologies to the development of not only their social and cultural
connections but also their identities should not be underestimated." Id. at 1030. The
use of such technology helps young people engage in expression, which promotes self-
realization and self-reflection. See generally JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN
DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 3-4 (2008)
(discussing how "the digital era has transformed how people live their lives and relate
to one another and to the world around them" and today's youth "live much of their
lives online, without distinguishing between the online and the offline"). "Instead of
thinking of their digital identity and their real-space identity as separate things, they
just have an identity (with representations in two, or three, or more different spaces)."
Id. at 4.
55. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 952 n.58 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("'The meaning of no other clause of the Bill of Rights at the time of
its framing and ratification has been so obscure to us' as the Free Speech and Press
Clause." (quoting L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 4 (1960))); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester,
797 F.2d 1164, 1183 (3d Cir. 1986) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) ("Over the years, the
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political speech.56  Further, different views exist on how much First
Amendment protection applies to student speech. Some believe
"'scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms"' at school is necessary,
lest we "'strangle the free mind at its source.' 5 Yet, others believe "the
First Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student
speech in public schools,"58 "early public schools were not places for
freewheeling debates or exploration of competing ideas,"59 and the
Supreme Court should reverse the "sea change" Tinker created by
protecting student speech rights.60 Under either viewpoint, speech
occurring outside the school environment should receive maximum
protection under the First Amendment.
If one believes scrupulous protection of free speech rights at school is
necessary, such as the right to wear clothing in protest of a controversial
war,61 it would be illogical to provide less protection to off-campus speech,
animating purpose of the speech-press clause has been the subject of much discussion
by justices and scholars alike."); Redish, supra note 44, at 591 ("There seems to be
general agreement that the Supreme Court has failed in its attempts to devise a
coherent theory of free expression." (citations omitted)).
56. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may
exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion
of governmental affairs.").
57. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)
(quoting West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). In Barnette, the Court
held a school cannot require students to salute the American flag. Barnette, 319 U.S. at
642. While Barnette is a student speech case, it concerns a student's right to not speak.
See id. at 629-30. For this reason, it is not included in Part II.A, infra, where the focus
is on affirmative student speech.
58. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410-11 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 411. But see Barber v. Dearborn Pub. Schs., 286 F. Supp. 2d 847,
858 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ("[A]s the Tinker Court and other courts have emphasized,
students benefit when school officials provide an environment where they can openly
express their diverging viewpoints and when they learn to tolerate the opinions of
others."). In Barber, a school prohibited a student from wearing a T-shirt that included
a photograph of then-President George W. Bush and the caption, "International
Terrorist." Id. at 849-50. The court granted the student's motion for a preliminary
injunction, finding he had a substantial likelihood of proving a First Amendment
violation because the school could not establish a substantial disruption of the school
environment as required by Tinker. See id. at 860.
60. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 410, 416 (Thomas, J., concurring). Rather than
creating another exception to Tinker, Justice Thomas proffered: "[Tihe better
approach is to dispense with Tinker altogether, and given the opportunity, I would do
so." Id. at 422.
61. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504; Barber, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 849; see also infra
[Vol. 59108
Online Student Speech and the First Amendment
especially when it creates no substantial disruption on campus. Yet, even if
another believes student speech rights are not protected in public schools,
there must be a limit on the reach of school jurisdiction over student
speech for at least three reasons. First, "[c]hildren have First Amendment
rights,"6 2 and they do not shed these constitutional rights at the
schoolhouse gate.63 If students do not have free speech rights, Tinker's
"schoolhouse gate" metaphor is meaningless because a student cannot shed
rights that do not exist.M
Second, the two main theories for allowing schools to restrict
students' constitutional free speech rights are delegation of parental
authority under in loco parentis61 and the need to maintain discipline within
the school environment." Neither of these theories support extending
school jurisdiction over off-campus student speech, at least when that
Part II.A.
62. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir.
2001) (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-14 (1975)). In
Erznoznik, the Court reversed a declaratory action upholding an ordinance that
prohibited theaters from showing films containing nudity if the film was visible from a
public place outside the theater. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 206-07. The City claimed the
ordinance was a reasonable means of keeping minors from viewing this material. Id. at
212. The Court disagreed, stating, "[M]inors are entitled to a significant measure of
First Amendment protection," and any restrictions targeting dissemination of
protected materials must be narrow and well-defined. Id. at 212-13 (citing Tinker, 393
U.S. at 503). State laws seeking to restrict minors' access to violent or sexually explicit
video games have been deemed unconstitutional. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v.
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, Schwarzenegger v.
Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich,
469 F.3d 641, 650-53 (7th Cir. 2006).
63. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
64. But cf id. at 514-15 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I cannot share the Court's
uncritical assumption that, school discipline aside, the First Amendment rights of
children are co-extensive with those of adults."). Justice Stewart's concurring opinion
is of limited value because he relies on Ginsberg v. New York, in which the Court held
New York could prohibit the sale of pornographic materials to minors, though parents
could still purchase such materials for their children. Id. at 515 (referencing Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-39 (1968)). Justice Stewart's concurrence does not
negatively impact the rule articulated here because this Article establishes schools do
not have jurisdiction over constitutionally protected, offensive online speech. See id.
65. Morse, 551 U.S. at 413 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Through the legal
doctrine of in loco parentis, courts upheld the right of schools to discipline students, to
enforce rules, and to maintain order.").
66. Id. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[A]ny argument for altering the usual
free speech rules in the public schools cannot rest on a theory of delegation but must
instead be based on some special characteristic of the school setting.").
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speech causes no substantial disruption of the school environment. Such
extension of jurisdiction not only violates students' speech rights, it also
violates parents' rights to raise their children as they believe proper. 7
Third, schools cannot extend their jurisdiction over student speech
merely because they disapprove of the speech or the speech does not
involve a matter of public concern.68 Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court has made clear offensive speech is protected by the First
Amendment, 69 and this protection applies to students.7 0 Children have the
right to play violent video games, view pornographic material with their
parents' consent, and create juvenile, offensive online posts that provide
little or no value to society.7' Thus, both ends of the student-speech-rights
spectrum reasonably and logically, though not necessarily, support strong
protection of student speech that occurs online and causes no substantial
disruption of the school environment.
67. Cf Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 (holding a prohibition on the sale of "girlie"
magazines "to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the
magazines for their children.").
68. Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 766 (9th Cir. 2006)
(stating student speech need not be a matter of public concern to receive First
Amendment protection under Tinker (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 266 (1988))).
69. E.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000)
("The history of the law of free expression is one of vindication in cases involving
speech that many citizens may find shabby, offensive, or even ugly."); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." (citations
omitted)); see, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (upholding the right to
privately possess obscene material, the Court found the First Amendment protects the
"right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth" (citing Winters
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948))).
70. Morse, 551 U.S. at 409 (rejecting the school's argument that Fraser applies
to any speech that is plainly offensive, the Court stated: "We think this stretches Fraser
too far; that case should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit under some
definition of 'offensive."').
71. Papandrea, supra note 34, at 1070 ("The idea that schools could regulate
offensive speech on the Internet without showing any harm to the school would give
school officials almost limitless authority to police their students' expression."); see also
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010), vacated,
reh'g en banc granted, No. 07-4465 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010); infra Part III.B.
[Vol. 59110
Online Student Speech and the First Amendment
A. Supreme Court Student-Speech Doctrines Consistently Focus on Speech
in the School Environment
The four Supreme Court cases directly addressing student speech
rights show school jurisdiction over student speech is limited and can be an
incursion on otherwise-protected First Amendment rights.72 Although the
Court has eroded Tinker's holding over time, it remains the seminal case
for student-speech doctrine. In Tinker, students were punished for wearing
black armbands to school as a protest against the Vietnam War.7 3 The
Court began its legal analysis by noting the "unmistakable" law that
students do not lose their First Amendment rights merely by entering the
school environment.7 4 While the Tinker majority acknowledged schools
may "prescribe and control conduct in the schools,"75 even on-campus
jurisdiction over student speech is limited.76
After recognizing the limited jurisdiction schools possess over student
speech, the Court held that the schools violated the students' First
Amendment rights because "the record [did] not demonstrate any facts
which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities, and no
disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred."77 The
72. See Morse, 551 U.S. 393; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260; Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969).
73. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
74. Id. at 506.
75. Id. at 507 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 513 ("If a regulation were adopted by school officials forbidding
discussion of the Vietnam conflict, or the expression by any student of opposition to it
anywhere on school property except as part of a prescribed classroom exercise, it
would be obvious that the regulation would violate the constitutional rights of students,
at least if it could not be justified by a showing that the students' activities would
materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school." (citations
omitted)).
77. Id. at 514. Tinker also stated student expression that invades "the rights
of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech." Id. at 513 (citing Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th
Cir. 1966)). Some courts seek to expand Tinker beyond its holding to include the right
of schools to prohibit speech that interferes with the rights of other students to be let
alone. E.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171, 1178 (9th Cir.
2006) (relying on the "rights of others" language in Tinker to uphold a school's
decision to prohibit a student from wearing a T-shirt with the statement,
"HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL," on the back and, "BE ASHAMED, OUR
SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED." on the front). The
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Court emphasized mere "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression."" A school must present some evidence to establish a
substantial disruption actually occurred or is reasonably forecasted to
occur.79
Even though the Tinker majority and dissenting opinions reached
opposite conclusions concerning the school's jurisdiction to punish students
for wearing the armbands, they were consistent in limiting the reach of
school jurisdiction over speech within the schoolhouse gate. Justice Black's
dissent stated the Court should give deference to a state's educational
institutions "to determine for themselves to what extent free expression
should be allowed in its schools."8  Justice Harlan's dissent stated,
"[S]chool officials should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining
discipline and good order in their institutions."8' Together, the majority
and dissenting opinions show school jurisdiction under Tinker is limited to
a likelihood of substantial disruption of the school environment.
In Fraser, the Court departed from the substantial-disruption test and
"rights of others" language in Tinker, however, is dicta because the Court expressly
stated the record contained no evidence wearing the armbands interfered with other
students' right to be let alone: "Accordingly, this case does not concern speech or
action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students."
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. Further, Kuhimeier declined to address a similar issue
involving the rights of others. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 n.5 (reversing the Eighth
Circuit's application of Tinker, and stating it "need not decide whether the Court of
Appeals correctly construed Tinker as precluding school officials from censoring
student speech to avoid 'invasion of the rights of others,' except where that speech
could result in tort liability to the school" (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513)). Thus,
Tinker's language regarding the rights of others remains dicta. See Papandrea, supra
note 34, at 1042-45 (commenting further on Harper and the "rights of others" language
in Tinker).
78. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
79. See id. at 508-09.
80. Id. at 520-21, 524 (Black, J., dissenting).
The truth is that a teacher of kindergarten, grammar school, or high school
pupils no more carries into a school with him a complete right to freedom of
speech and expression than an anti-Catholic or anti-Semite carries with him a
complete freedom of speech and religion into a Catholic church or Jewish
synagogue.
Id. at 521-22.
81. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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created a new test-an exception to Tinker.82 At a mandatory school
assembly, Fraser gave a speech nominating a fellow student for student
government." Although the Court referred to the speech as "sexually
explicit,"4 that description is inaccurate because the speech involved sexual
innuendo and double entendres, not explicit references to sexual activities
or organs.85 Regardless, the speech involved implicit sexual content.
As a result of his speech, the school suspended Fraser for three days
and prohibited him from being eligible to speak at graduation.8 6  At his
school-district-grievance process, the examiner upheld Fraser's
punishment, finding his speech "obscene" under the school's "disruptive-
conduct" rule.17 The district court overruled the administrative decision on
82. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
83. Id. at 677 ("Students were required to attend the assembly or to report to
the study hall.").
84. Id. at 685.
85. After noting the majority referred to the speech "as 'obscene,' 'vulgar,'
'lewd,' and 'offensively lewd,"' Justice Brennan commented in his concurring opinion:
"Having read the full text of respondent's remarks, I find it difficult to believe that it is
the same speech the Court describes." Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens also criticized the majority's characterization of Fraser's speech as "obscene"
and "profane" because "there is no such language in respondent's speech." Id. at 694
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's concurring opinion quotes Fraser's speech:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his
character is firm-but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel,
is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll
take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he
drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and every
one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and
the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 678-79 (majority opinion) ("Fraser served two days of his
suspension, and was allowed to return to school on the third day."). Fraser delivered a
speech at commencement as a result of write-in votes by his classmates. Id. at 679.
Fraser became eligible to speak at commencement after the district court enjoined the
school from preventing him from speaking at graduation. Id.
87. Id. at 678-79. The school used the following definition: "'Disruptive
Conduct. Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational
process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures."' Id.
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First Amendment grounds, finding the disruptive-conduct rule vague and
overbroad."8
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling by
applying Tinker and reasoning the school district failed to establish a
substantial disruption.89 The Ninth Circuit rejected the School's argument
that FCC v. Pacifica Foundation provided support for the school to punish
Fraser.90 In Pacifica, the Court narrowly held the Federal Communications
Commission could regulate indecent content-content that generally
receives First Amendment protection-on broadcast radio and television
because those media were "uniquely pervasive" in society and "uniquely
accessible to children." 91 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that it could not
expand Pacifica to allow public high schools to regulate indecent speech
because "the rationales of Pacifica have no applicability to the high school
environment, especially to an assembly convened for student political
speech-making."2
at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d
1356, 1357 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)).
88. Id. at 679. The district court also found the school violated Fraser's due
process rights because the disruptive-conduct rule did not list ineligibility to speak at
graduation as a possible sanction for violating that rule. Id. That court awarded Fraser
$278 in damages and $12,750 in attorney's fees, and enjoined the school from making
Fraser ineligible to speak at graduation. Id.
89. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1359, rev'd, 478 U.S. 675.
90. Id. at 1362-63 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)).
91. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 728, 748-50. The specific content in Pacifica was the
late George Carlin's famous monologue, Filthy Words. Id. at 729, 751-55.
92. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1363. One wonders whether the rationales from the
1978 Pacifica decision have any applicability today. Pacifica reasoned indecency could
be regulated on broadcast radio and television without violating the First Amendment
because of the mediums' unique pervasiveness in society and unique accessibility to
children. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. With the rise of cable, Internet, satellite, and
other wireless devices, broadcast is no longer uniquely accessible and uniquely
pervasive. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 465 (2d Cir. 2007)
("[W]e would be remiss not to observe that it is increasingly difficult to describe the
broadcast media as uniquely pervasive and uniquely accessible to children, and at some
point in the future, strict scrutiny may properly apply in the context of regulating
broadcast television."), rev'd and remanded, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). The Supreme
Court declined to rule on the idea the Pacifica rationales no longer apply and limited
its holding to the Administrative Procedure Act. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1811-12, 1814, 1819
(holding the FCC's decision to change its rule from allowing "fleeting expletives" on
broadcast radio and television to finding such language sanctionable as indecent
content was not "arbitrary and capricious"). On remand, the Second Circuit held the
FCC's rule making "fleeting expletives" actionable as indecent content violated the
First Amendment because the rule was unconstitutionally vague. Fox Television
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The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding by creating a
new exception that does not require a substantial disruption before a
school can punish student speech.93 After criticizing the Ninth Circuit for
failing to differentiate between the political speech in Tinker and Fraser's
sexually charged speech,94 the Court held, "[P]etitioner School District
acted entirely within its permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon
Fraser 'in response to his offensively lewd and indecent speech."95
Although the Court recently stated its mode of analysis "in Fraser is not
entirely clear," 96 the Fraser majority outlined three factors that explained
its departure from Tinker and established the limits of school jurisdiction:
(1) Fraser presented his speech to a captive school audience; (2) the speech
involved sexual content; and (3) the school needed to disassociate itself
from speech at a mandatory school assembly. 97
First, Fraser requires a "captive audience."98 The Court framed the
issue to limit the question presented to "a lewd speech at a school
assembly" 99 and reasoned "[a] high school assembly or classroom is no
place for" Fraser's speech.10o Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
highlighted the captive nature of the audience is sine qua non for schools to
punish Fraser-type speech by unequivocally stating, "[T]he Court's holding
concerns only the authority that school officials have to restrict a high
school student's use of disruptive language in a speech given to a high
school assembly."101 Absent a substantial disruption, a school could not
punish a student for giving a lewd and indecent speech on the playground
unless a "captive audience" existed. 102 Otherwise, Fraser would overrule
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 2010). The Second Circuit reiterated
its observation that broadcast radio and television are not as uniquely pervasive in
society or uniquely accessible to children as they were in 1978 when the Court decided
Pacifica, but it noted it was bound to apply the Pacifica framework "regardless of
whether it reflects today's realities." Id. at 326-27.
93. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-87.
94. Id. at 680 ("The marked distinction between the political 'message' of the
armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent's speech in this case seems to
have been given little weight by the Court of Appeals.").
95. Id. at 685.
96. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007).
97. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684-86.
98. Id. at 684.
99. Id. at 677.
100. Id. at 685.
101. Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
102. See id. at 684-85 (majority opinion).
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Tinker, which it did not. Tinker remains valid law.
Logically, if a school cannot punish lewd and indecent speech at
school when there is no captive audience, a school cannot punish the same
speech that occurs off campus. Several times, the Court referenced speech
occurring "in school."103 Justice Brennan expressly made the point: "If
respondent had given the same speech outside of the school environment,
he could not have been penalized simply because government officials
considered his language to be inappropriate; the Court's opinion does not
suggest otherwise."104 A school could not punish Fraser for wearing
Cohen's "Fuck the Draft" jacket when off campus, even though it might be
able to if he wore the same jacket at school. 0 Nor should a school be able
to punish a student who posts the message, "Fuck the School," in an online
forum because there is no captive audience in cyberspace.
Second, unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Court found Pacifica and other
cases involving sexual content as persuasive authority for allowing schools
to regulate on-campus student speech, even when it does not cause a
substantial disruption.io6 The Court reasoned, "These cases recognize the
obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in
103. Id. at 681 ("The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and
controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior." (emphasis added)); id. at 682 ("It does not follow, however, that simply
because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults
making what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be
permitted to children in a public school." (emphasis added)); id. at 682-83 ("'[T]he
First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's
armband, but not Cohen's jacket."' (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.,
607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring))); id. at 683 ("The
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board." (emphasis added)); id. at 686
("We have recognized that 'maintaining security and order in the schools requires a
certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures . . .. (emphasis added)
(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985))).
104. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971)).
105. The Fraser majority approvingly quoted a Second Circuit concurring
opinion stating: "'[T]he First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom
right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket."' Id. at 682-83 (majority
opinion) (quoting Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1057 (Newman, J., concurring)). See also infra
Part III.D.1 (discussing Thomas).
106. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-86 (discussing the sexual nature of Fraser's speech
as an explanation for departing from Tinker's substantial-disruption test).
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loco parentis, to protect children-especially in a captive audience-from
exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech."107 Indeed, the
Court limited its express holding to "lewd and indecent speech."10 Despite
the Court's holding and rationale limiting Fraser to lewd and indecent
speech, there is uncertainty in the lower courts as to whether Fraser applies
to "plainly offensive"c" speech that is not lewd or indecent.110 Not only do
107. Id. at 684; see also id. at 685 ("A high school assembly or classroom is no
place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of
teenage students.").
108. Id. at 685.
109. Id. at 683 ("The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech was plainly
offensive to both teachers and students-indeed to any mature person."). As the
preceding quote shows, even the phrase "plainly offensive" is tied to sexual speech.
110. Compare, e.g., Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th
Cir. 2000), with Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006). In Boroff, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of a school because a student wore a
"plainly offensive" Marilyn Manson T-shirt. Boroff, 220 F.3d at 466, 469. Although
the T-shirt did not contain any lewd or indecent images or words, the court reasoned
because "Boroff's T-shirts contain[ed] symbols and words that promote values that are
so patently contrary to the school's educational mission, the School has the authority,
under the circumstances of this case, to prohibit those T-shirts." Id. at 470. Although
the dissenting judge would have remanded the case for trial because a reasonable jury
could conclude the school officials improperly prevented a student from wearing a T-
shirt because it communicated a message with which they disagreed, he would not limit
Fraser's applicability to lewd or indecent speech. See id. at 472, 474-76 (Gilman, J.,
dissenting). "I have little doubt that school administrators may reasonably decide that
certain rock performers are so closely identified with illegal drug use or other unlawful
activities that T-shirts bearing their images are unacceptable for high school students to
wear in school." Id. at 472 (citing Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1206 (4th Cir.
1980)).
In Guiles, the Second Circuit expressly rejected Boroff s interpretation of
Fraser. Guiles, 461 F.3d at 329. In that case, a student wore a T-shirt critical of then-
President George W. Bush that included images of drugs and alcohol. Id. at 322. The
school censored the T-shirt and the district court upheld the school's right to do so
under Fraser, finding the shirt "plainly offensive." Id. at 323. The Second Circuit
rejected the district court's application of Fraser to the case. Id. at 327. "Courts that
address Fraser appear to treat 'plainly offensive' synonymously with and as part and
parcel of speech that is lewd, vulgar, and indecent-meaning speech that is something
less than obscene but related to that concept, that is to say, speech containing sexual
innuendo and profanity." Id. at 328 (citing Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1118-19
(9th Cir. 2006), rev'd and remanded, 551 U.S. 393, vacated, 499 F.3d 926 (9th Cir.
2007)). Although the Second Circuit declined to define the outer limits of "plainly
offensive" speech under Fraser, "the phrase 'plainly offensive' as used in Fraser cannot
be so broad as to be triggered whenever a school decides a student's expression
conflicts with its 'educational mission' or claims a legitimate pedagogical concern." Id.
at 330. Thus, the Second Circuit expressly declined to follow Boroff. Id. at 329.
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the express holding and rationale of Fraser establish that it only applies to
lewd and indecent speech, the Court's framing of the issue also shows the
limits of Fraser: "We granted certiorari to decide whether the First
Amendment prevents a school district from disciplining a high school
student for giving a lewd speech at a school assembly.""'
Third, the school had the right to "disassociate itself" from Fraser's
speech because it occurred at a mandatory school assembly."2 A school
has no need to disassociate itself from off-campus student speech that is not
part of a school-sponsored event because no one could reasonably
associate a school with such speech. Similarly, a school need not
disassociate itself from online student speech because there is no
reasonable association between a school and online student speech. Thus,
Fraser's applicability is limited in three significant ways. Fraser only
applies to speech that: (1) occurs before a "captive audience" at school;" 3
(2) involves lewd or indecent sexual content;114 and (3) occurs under
circumstances where a school must "disassociate itself" from the speech."5
The Supreme Court's third case concerning student speech,
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, involved the right of schools to
censor school-sponsored speech." 6 The principal prevented two articles
from being published in a school-sponsored newspaper.117 The Supreme
Court held that schools may exercise editorial control over "school-
sponsored expressive activities" when that control is "reasonably related to
Guiles's analysis of Fraser is consistent with the reasoning in Fraser because the Court
focused on the sexual nature of the speech and relied on cases like Pacifica and
Ginsberg to support its holding. See id. at 328-29.
111. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677.
112. Id. at 685-86 ("A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a
sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage
students. Accordingly, it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself
to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly
inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school education.").
113. Id. at 684.
114. Id. at 685.
115. Id. at 684-86.
116. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).
117. Id. at 263-64. One article addressed teen pregnancy. Id. at 263. The
principal had concerns the students mentioned in this article would lose their
anonymity, even though they were given fictitious names. Id. The other article
addressed the impact of divorce on students. Id. The principal had concerns this
article would invade the privacy of the students and parents discussed in the article. Id.
Student members of the paper filed suit alleging this censorship violated their First
Amendment rights: Id. at 264.
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legitimate pedagogical concerns.""'s The Hazelwood Court reasoned that
"students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive [a
school-sponsored newspaper] to bear the imprimatur of the school" based
on the school's involvement with the speech.1 19 This reasoning is consistent
with Fraser. Similar to Fraser, in which the school had a need to
disassociate itself from a lewd or indecent speech at a mandatory assembly,
"a school may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or
producer of a school play 'dissociate itself"' from that speech.12 0  In
Hazelwood, the school dissociated itself through censorship.
The concern of "disassociating itself" from a student's speech because
of the risk the speech may bear the "imprimatur of the school" does not
arise with off-campus or online speech, regardless of where it occurs. Like
Tinker and Fraser, Hazelwood supports the position that schools may limit
on-campus speech, "even though the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school."1 21 Although Hazelwood further eroded Tinker
by creating another new student-speech doctrine that allows schools to
punish student speech, the Court maintained consistency by recognizing
the limited jurisdiction schools possess over student speech. "Even in its
capacity as educator the State may not assume an Orwellian 'guardianship
of the public mind.' 122
The most recent Supreme Court case on student speech created a
third exception to Tinker and seemingly began to blur the lines between
on-campus and off-campus speech. In Morse v. Frederick, Joseph
Frederick, a senior at Juneau-Douglas High School, arrived to school late
but still in time to join his friends across the street from the high school to
watch the Olympic Torch Relay.123 The school allowed students to go
outside and watch the event.124 As the torch neared, Frederick unfurled a
banner with a "cryptic"125 message that a majority of the Court deciphered
118. Id. at 273.
119. Id. at 271.
120. Id. (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
121. Id. at 266. In Fraser, the Court recognized '"[t]he determination of what
manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests
with the school board,' rather than with the federal courts." Id. at 267 (emphasis
added) (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
122. Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
123. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 401 ("The message on Frederick's banner is cryptic. It is no doubt
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to be pro-drug: "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS." 126 When Frederick refused his
principal's request to furl the banner, the school suspended Frederick for
ten days.127 The federal district court upheld the suspension under Fraser,
but the Ninth Circuit reversed. 12 8
Reasonably, the Ninth Circuit found neither the Fraser nor Kuhlmeier
exceptions to Tinker applied to Frederick's banner. 129 Fraser did not apply
because "[t]he phrase 'Bong Hits 4 Jesus' may be funny, stupid, or
insulting, depending on one's point of view, but it is not 'plainly offensive'
in the way sexual innuendo is."13 0 Kuhlmeier did not apply because
Frederick's banner did not bear the imprimatur of the school.131 Applying
offensive to some, perhaps amusing to others. To still others, it probably means
nothing at all."). It is puzzling that the majority describes the message as "cryptic,"
offers alternative interpretations, and then allows a school to punish the student based
on one interpretation of an admittedly obscure message. Moreover, this approach
contradicts a different approach taken by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito in
another free speech opinion issued on the very same day as Morse. See FEC v. Wis.
Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). In Wis. Right to Life, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito declared, "Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the
speaker, not the censor." Id. at 474 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
126. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
127. Id. at 398.
128. Frederick v. Morse, No. J 02-008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at *2-
3,*5--6 (D. Alaska May 29, 2003), vacated, 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd and
remanded, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). The Morse district court decision exemplifies a
misapplication of Fraser because the court interpreted Fraser to apply to speech that
did not involve lewd or indecent speech. Id. at *5 ("Frederick is incorrect that Fraser
applies only to lewd and obscene language."). In part, the Morse district court relied
on Boroff. Id. at *5 n.38. Even the Supreme Court's majority found Fraser did not
apply to Frederick's banner, although it declined to define the limits of Fraser. See
Morse, 551 U.S. at 409 (The Court declined to accept the argument Frederick's banner
is punishable under Fraser, and stated, "We think this stretches Fraser too far; that case
should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit under some definition of
'offensive."'). See also supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing further the
meaning of "plainly offensive").
129. Morse, 439 F.3d at 1123.
130. Id. at 1119. Although the Ninth Circuit did not expressly rule Fraser is
limited to lewd or indecent speech, it did recognize the sexual nature of Fraser's speech
was material to the Supreme Court's analysis in Fraser: "Our case differs from Fraser
in that Frederick's speech was not sexual (sexual speech can be expected to stimulate
disorder among those new to adult hormones), and did not disrupt a school assembly."
Id. Like the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the Sixth Circuit's
expansive interpretation of "plainly offensive" student speech subject to regulation by
schools under Fraser. Id. at 1122; see also supra note 110 (discussing the meaning of
"plainly offensive" in the Second and Sixth Circuits).
131. Morse, 439 F.3d at 1119 ("Kuhlmeier does not control the case at bar,
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Tinker, the Ninth Circuit held the school violated Frederick's clearly
established First Amendment rights because unfurling the banner did not
cause a substantial disruption of the work or discipline of the school. 13 2
Apparently not satisfied with the results under Tinker, the Supreme Court
invented yet another new student-speech exception "out of whole cloth,"
one that created more authority for schools to punish student speech and
further eroded the protection provided under Tinker.33 The new rule
announced in Morse is that schools may punish student speech if it could
reasonably be interpreted to advocate illegal drug use.134
Despite creating another exception to Tinker, Morse is consistent
with the three previous student-speech cases in that it recognized the limits
of school jurisdiction over student speech. "Had Fraser delivered the same
speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been
protected."l 35  Although one can reasonably disagree as to whether
Frederick unfurling a banner on a public sidewalk across the street from his
school during the Olympic Torch Relay qualifies as "student" speech
subject to school jurisdiction, the Court rejected the argument that Morse
involved speech outside the school environment. 136 The first sentence of
the majority opinion set the stage by referring to Frederick's speech as
occurring "[a]t a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event . . . ."137
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Morse also provide support
for the limited jurisdiction schools possess over student speech. Justice
Thomas did not believe "the First Amendment, as originally understood,
however, because Frederick's pro-drug banner was not sponsored or endorsed by the
school, nor was it part of the curriculum, nor did it take place as part of an official
school activity.").
132. Id. at 1123-25.
133. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 446 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Creating a new test "out of whole cloth" contradicted Chief Justice Roberts's
purported fidelity to judicial restraint and conflicted with general expectations of the
role of the judiciary. See TOMAIN, supra note 50, at 121 ("We desire law to provide
determinate answers to the conflicts that find their way to courts, and in turn, we desire
judges who apply the law instead of making it out of whole cloth.").
134. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (majority opinion) ("[W]e hold that schools may
take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably
be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.").
135. Id. at 405 (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 400 ("The event occurred during normal school hours. It was
sanctioned by Principal Morse 'as an approved social event or class trip . . . .' (citation
omitted)).
137. Id. at 396.
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[protected] student speech in public schools."'a Justice Alito noted
arguments for limiting student-speech rights in public schools must "be
based on some special characteristic of the school setting," as opposed to in
loco parentis.13 9 Justice Breyer agreed Frederick's speech occurred "during
a school-related event."140  Justice Stevens emphasized student-speech
doctrines apply only "in school settings" and the First Amendment
"unquestionably" would have protected Frederick's speech but for the
Court's finding his speech occurred at a school-sponsored event.141
A common thread in all four of the Court's student-speech cases is
that the school punished speech occurring either at school or a school-
sponsored event. * As to the limits of school jurisdiction over student
speech, the Morse Court stated, "There is some uncertainty at the
outer boundaries as to when courts should apply school speech
precedents . . . ."142 In light of the schools' incursion on students' First
Amendment rights under these doctrines, the value of free speech to
individual self-realization, and the well-established policy of avoiding
chilling free speech, adopting a bright-line rule that Fraser does not apply
to online speech helps remove some uncertainty as to the limits of school
jurisdiction over online student speech. This bright-line rule applies to
Fraser-type online speech, regardless of whether it occurs on or off campus.
B. Jurisdictional Borders: Cyberspace and Physical Space
The Supreme Court has allowed schools to restrict students' free
speech rights within the schoolhouse gate and at school-sponsored events
in ways the First Amendment would not otherwise allow. The Court has
not yet addressed how these doctrines might apply outside the school
environment. 143 Recently, lower courts have struggled with whether and
how to apply Fraser to online speech. Courts struggling to apply existing
legal doctrine in cyberspace is not unique to student speech law.144 The
138. Id. at 410-11 (Thomas, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring).
140. See id. at 427 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. Id. at 434 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 401 (majority opinion) (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd.,
393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th Cir. 2004)).
143. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
144. Most law schools now offer courses dedicated to exploring how
cyberspace requires us to rethink-or at least reconsider-a wide range of current legal
doctrines, including free speech rights. See Eric Goldman, Teaching Cyberlaw, 52 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 749, 751 (2008) ("[In 2008], between one-half and two-thirds of U.S. law
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new experiences of online interaction require courts, legislatures, and
commentators to consider whether and how to apply a variety of familiar
legal principles that operate in the physical world to the unfamiliar world
of cyberspace.145 Analyzing school jurisdiction over online speech provides
the opportunity to consider two areas of cyberlaw commentary on the
micro-level: (1) the debate between exceptionalists and unexceptionalists
and (2) the proper role of metaphor and analogy.
Problems of geography and jurisdiction are common in analyzing
online interactions. Early cyberlaw scholarship defined two main
competing positions on comparing cyberspace to the physical world:
exceptionalism and unexceptionalism.146 On the one hand, exceptionalists
view cyberspace as unique from the real world and require new or different
legal rules to properly regulate this new space.147 David Johnson and
David Post state the online world transcends geographic boundaries and
nation-states cannot impose their laws on online activity without resulting
in a monopoly of rulemaking authority over online activity by one
sovereign. 148 On the other hand, unexceptionalists like Jack Goldsmith
argue "territorial regulation of the Internet is no less feasible and no less
legitimate than territorial regulation of non-Internet transactions."149 The
debate between exceptionalism and unexceptionalism helps provide a
framework for deciding, or at least discussing, whether online interaction is
schools regularly offer[ed] at least one Cyberlaw course." (citing Kenneth L. Port,
Essay on Intellectual Property Curricula in the United States, 46 IDEA 165, 170 (2005)).
145. See generally PATRICIA L. BELLIA, PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN & DAVID G.
POST, CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION
AGE (3d ed. 2007) (describing the various philosophical, jurisdictional, technical,
constitutional, and cultural issues involved in cyberlaw).
146. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199,
1200-01 (1998) (explaining how communication in cyberspace is legitimately capable of
regulation in regards to jurisdiction and choice of law). But see David G. Post, Against
"Against Cyberanarchy," 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1365-69 (2002) (supporting
the exceptionalism position that communication in cyberspace is not the same as
communication in real space in regards to choice-of-law and jurisdictional principles).
147. Post, supra note 146, at 1368-69.
148. Johnson & Post, supra note 52, at 1390-91 ("Governments cannot stop
electronic communications from coming across their borders, even if they want to do
so. Nor can they credibly claim a right to regulate the Net based on supposed local
harms caused by activities that originate outside their borders and that travel
electronically to many different nations. One nation's legal institutions should not
monopolize rule-making for the entire Net.").
149. Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial
Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 475 (1998).
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sufficiently analogous to a real world interaction when existing legal
principles apply, or whether new laws are necessary to meet the changing
times.
Exceptionalists are correct in expressing concerns about one
jurisdiction overreaching its assertion of authority into another jurisdiction
when regulating cyberspace activity, especially when that assertion of
jurisdiction restricts freedom of speech. French law prohibits the display of
Nazi-related items in France.5 0 Does France have personal jurisdiction
over Yahoo!, an American company, because Yahoo! displays Nazi-related
items on its website? Italian privacy law can result in criminal sanctions for
mishandling another's personal information for profit.151 Does Italy have
jurisdiction over Google executives for third-party content posted on
Google's YouTube website that is based on revenue generated from
advertisers? 152 The Yahoo! and Google examples illustrate the conflicts
between laws of nation-states that result when a geographic sovereign
seeks to regulate online interactions. Cyberspace is not connected to a
physical place. If France is able to dictate the content of Yahoo!, then a
foreign sovereign curtails First Amendment rights of a United States
company merely because the content is available online and accessible in
France.153 If Italy is able to criminally prosecute Google executives, then
rights and liberties of United States citizens are infringed.
Although the Yahoo! and Google examples focus on the conflict-of-
law problems that arise when nations seek to regulate cyberspace, the
examples are instructive when considering the reach of school jurisdiction
over online student speech because similar jurisdictional conflicts arise.
French law prohibits the display of Nazi-related items in France, but the
150. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1181, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd en banc, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
151. See, e.g., Rachel Donadio, Larger Threat Is Seen in Google Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/technology
/companies/25google.html?pagewanted=all; Adam Liptak, When American and
European Ideas of Privacy Collide, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 2010, at WK1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/weekinreview/28liptak.html.
152. An Italian court found three Google executives in violation of Italian
privacy law-Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights-for a video
posted by a third party on YouTube that showed teenage boys harassing an autistic
child. See Liptak, supra note 151; see also Donadio, supra note 151.
153. See Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1217-18. This is not to say First Amendment
rights of artificial entities are or should be coextensive with the rights of individuals.
The current majority of the Supreme Court, however, seems to be leaning in that
direction. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898-99 (2010).
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First Amendment protects the same material in the United States. 154
Schools may prohibit lewd and indecent speech at a school assembly, but
the First Amendment protects the same speech outside the schoolhouse
gate. 155 In both instances, one sovereign seeks to extraterritorially impose
its authority, coming into conflict with the laws of another jurisdiction.
Neither France, nor Italy, nor schools should be able to exert a monopoly
on rulemaking authority over speech generally protected by the First
Amendment merely because the speech is accessible online and ostensibly
violates their respective jurisdictional laws or rules. Cyberspace is not the
equivalent of the physical world. Exceptionalism shows new solutions are
needed to determine the jurisdictional limits of sovereigns over online
interactions, especially when the laws of two sovereigns conflict.'56
Adopting an exceptionalist viewpoint, however, does not inherently
preclude school jurisdiction over online, Fraser-type speech. The school
defendants in Layshock, Blue Mountain, and Doninger relied on
exceptionalists' arguments in their appellate briefs as support for extending
Fraser-jurisdiction over online student speech by arguing against a
geographical approach for limiting school jurisdiction over student
speech.15 7 They argue the impact of online student speech in the school
environment is so significant it merits extended jurisdiction.15 8 Essentially,
154. See Yahoo!, 443 F.3d at 1217-18 (noting whether the French court's ruling
affected only those outside the United States would impact a First Amendment
analysis).
155. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680, 685-86 (1986).
156. A recent example of the United States seeking to protect First
Amendment rights in conflict with speech laws of foreign nations is the SPEECH Act,
signed into law on August 10, 2010. SPEECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380
(2010) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 4101). The SPEECH Act prohibits United States
courts from enforcing defamation judgments issued by foreign nations, unless they
comport with First Amendment and due process requirements. § 3, 124 Stat. at 2381-
82 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. H§ 4102(a)-(b)).
157. Brief of Appellant/Cross Appellee, supra note 36, at 13-16; Brief of
Appellee, Blue Mountain School District, supra note 36, at 20-21 ("The pure
geographic approach . . . is outdated and unworkable."); Supplemental Response and
Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 31, Doninger v. Niehoff, 527
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2009) (Nos. 09-1452-cv(L), 09-1601-cv(XAP), 09-2261-cv(CON))
("'[T]erritoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in determining the limit of [school]
authority."' (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979))).
158. E.g., Brief of Appellee, Blue Mountain School District, supra note 36, at
20 ("Specifically, whereas before students were limited to traditional means of
communication such as a pen and paper, students today are able to use the internet,
personal web pages and/or blogs, to transmit messages that are available to the entire
world at anytime of day.").
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they argue offensive, online speech is not functionally identical to
offensive, offline speech and schools need exceptional jurisdiction over
online speech to preserve the school environment. 159 There are at least
three reasons to reject the schools' exceptionalist arguments: (1) online
speech does not satisfy Fraser because there is no captive audience online
and no need for a school to disassociate itself from online student speech;160
(2) the self-realization theory and the role cyberspace plays in the lives of
youth dictate that First Amendment rights receive strong protection in
cyberspace; 161 and (3) too often, schools impose excessive punishments for
online speech, showing they are not impartial decision makers.162 Thus, the
debate between exceptionalism and unexceptionalism is helpful, but not
conclusive, in resolving whether Fraser applies to online student speech
because both opponents and proponents of applying Fraser to online
student speech can make exceptionalist arguments to support their
respective positions. For purposes of this Article, the key point is that
exceptionalism shows how regulation of cyberspace can result in a conflict
of laws between jurisdictions, and resolution of this conflict must protect
First Amendment rights.
Another subject of cyberlaw scholarship considers the use of
metaphors and analogies to make the unfamiliar world of cyberspace
familiar. Scholars consider the validity of analogizing cyberspace to
physical space. Is Yahoo! "in" France merely because it is accessible from
computers in France? Did a student "enter" school property merely by
accessing the school's publicly available website from a home computer
and copying a photo of the principal?163 While some find physical space a
relevant analogy for cyberspace,'" others claim "any analogy to a physical
159. Post, supra note 146, at 1376-81 (arguing Internet activities are not
functionally identical to similar activities in real space and "[d]ifferences in degree
sometimes become differences in kind"). But see Goldsmith, supra note 149, at 479
("Internet activities are functionally identical to these non-Internet activities.").
160. See supra Part II.A; infra Part III.B-D.
161. See infra Part IV.
162. See infra Part IV.B.
163. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 259-60 (3d Cir. Feb. 4,
2010) (rejecting the School District's argument the student "entered" school property
by accessing the school's publicly available website from home and copying a
photograph of his principal to use on the parody profile webpage), vacated, reh'g en
banc granted, No. 07-4465 (3d Cir. Apr. 9,2010).
164. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 146, at 1244-50; Goldsmith, supra note
149, at 475.
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space is a poor one."16s As this conversation evolved, an emerging
consensus developed: analogy to physical space is helpful but of limited
value, and the law should not get swept away in analyzing metaphors and
analogies to the detriment of developing legal rules and normative
analysis. 66
Regardless of metaphors or analogies between cyberspace and real
space, when free speech rights are involved, our longstanding commitment
to freedom of speech guides us to err in favor of protecting these rights.
Online speech complicates the analysis, but that is precisely the point of
adopting clear legal rules, when possible, that give sufficient notice as to
the limits of jurisdiction over online speech. 67 When it comes to free
speech rights, Congress and the Supreme Court have both provided strong
165. Daniel Benoliel, Law, Geography and Cyberspace: The Case of On-Line
Territorial Privacy, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 129 (2005); see also Dan
Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L.
REV. 439, 444 (2003) (positing that using metaphors of physical space results in
negative consequence of "creating millions of splintered [private] rights ... and these
rights are destroying the commons-like character of the Internet that has previously led
to extraordinary innovation"). Blue Mountain School District's argument the student
"entered" school property by accessing the school's publicly available website from
home exemplifies Hunter's point that using metaphors of physical space could have the
negative consequence of destroying the commons-like nature of the Internet because
the school is using the metaphor to extend its jurisdiction over online student speech.
See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 11, 2008), affd, 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010), vacated, reh'g en banc granted,
No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
166. Julie E. Cohen, Essay, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210,
213 (2007) ("The important question is not what kind of space cyberspace is, but what
kind of space a world that includes cyberspace is and will become."); Hunter, supra
note 165 at 443 (arguing a drawback of using the "cyberspace as place metaphor" is it
confuses "the descriptive question of whether we think of cyberspace as a place with
the normative question of whether we should regulate cyberspace as a regime
independent of national laws"); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L.
REV. 521, 542 (2003) ("The CYBERSPACE AS PLACE metaphor can be valuable.... [but]
[c]ourts must also understand that metaphor is no substitute for legal analysis.").
167. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 223 (D. Conn. 2009) ("First
Amendment jurisprudence will need to evolve in order to address this new
environment [of online speech]."); Blue Mountain, 2008 WL 4279517, at *7 n.5 ("[T]he
line between on-campus and off-campus speech is blurred with increased use of the
internet and the ability of students to access the internet at school, on their own
personal computers, school computers and even cellular telephones."); J.S. v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 863-64 (Pa. 2002) ("Moreover, the advent of
the Internet has complicated analysis of restrictions on speech." (citing Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 3421 (May 13, 2002))).
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protections to online speech.
In enacting section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,168
Congress provided immunity to interactive computer services-
Craigslist,169 MySpace,170 America Online,'7' and an individual's blog,172 for
example-for content created by others but available on those services.
This immunity departs from the real world rules of distributor and
publisher liability.173 One purpose of this legislation is to ensure the
Internet remains "a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity." 174 Just as the rule set forth here, section 230 protects offensive
168. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
169. Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,
519 F.3d 666, 668, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding Craigslist was not liable for third-
party content on its website that allegedly violated the Fair Housing Act by listing
housing preferences based on race, religion, sex, or family status because Craigslist was
not a "publisher" or "speaker" under the Communications Decency Act, a
requirement for finding a violation of the Fair Housing Act); see also Fair Hous.
Council v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 n.33 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(distinguishing Craigslist by finding Roommates.com created or developed, in part, the
allegedly discriminatory content). Roommates.com is an outlier among section 230
cases in finding an interactive computer service is subject to potential liability when a
third party creates or develops content. The Roommates.com dissent provided
persuasive analysis as to why section 230 immunity should apply to Roommates.com.
See id. at 1176-89 (McKeown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008). In Doe, the court
held, based on section 230 immunity, MySpace was not liable for alleged negligence by
allowing a nineteen-year-old male to communicate with a fourteen-year-old female.
Id. at 416, 422. After communicating on MySpace, the two individuals met, and the
male subsequently sexually assaulted the female. Id. at 416.
171. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 334-35 (4th Cir. 1997).
172. The key to section 230 immunity is being an "interactive computer
service" that does not create or develop, in whole or in part, the allegedly actionable
content. See § 230(c)(1), (f)(2). An individual hosting a blog site is protected by this
immunity just as business entities that host interactive websites are.
173. Congress specifically passed section 230, in part, to overrule a court
decision that found the owner of a computer network liable as a publisher of content
posted by a third party on one of the computer network's bulletin boards. H.R. REP.
No. 104-458, at 194 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 207, 208 ("One of the
specific purposes of [section 230] is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any
other similar decisions . . . . The conferees believe that such decisions create serious
obstacles to the important federal policy of empowering parents to determine the
content of communications their children receive through interactive computer
services.").
174. § 230(a)(3).
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speech. In Zeran v. America Online, the Fourth Circuit upheld America
Online's immunity when an unidentified person falsely attributed the
creation of tasteless T-shirts that concerned the bombing of the federal
building in Oklahoma City to Kenneth Zeran and provided his contact
information. 17  The court upheld America Online's immunity even though
Zeran provided notice he did not post the information and had received
death threats because of the posting. 7 6
This congressional decision to provide strong protection to online
speech, regardless of the value of the speech, is consistent with the
Supreme Court's understanding of online free speech rights. In Reno v.
ACLU, the Court struck down legislation that sought to protect minors
from sexually explicit speech and stated the Internet "is entitled to 'the
highest protection from governmental intrusion."' 177 Both Congress and
the Court provide strong protection for online speech rights, even if the
speech is offensive or exposes minors to sexually explicit content.178 When
speech rights are the issue, they should receive the strongest protection
possible, especially in cyberspace.
Allowing schools to apply Fraser to online speech results in a
monopoly by the school over student speech rights and the rights of others,
a monopoly that restricts rights guaranteed by the Constitution.17 9 A high
school senior has a constitutional right to engage in protected, albeit
offensive, online speech about his teacher. A high school junior class
secretary has a right to engage in online speech to communicate with
citizens and call school administrators "douchebags," if she chooses.
Further, citizens have the right to receive such online speech.s 0
The geographic location of the online speech is immaterial when
applying Fraser because there is no captive audience online, even if the
175. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328-29.
176. Id.
177. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 863 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
178. See id. at 867, 869 (rationalizing protections by distinguishing the Internet
from other forums because the "risk of encountering indecent material by accident is
remote" due to the affirmative steps necessary to access such material).
179. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding
school officials could prohibit "vulgar and lewd speech" without violating the First
Amendment because it "undermine[d] the school's basic educational mission").
180. See infra Part IV.A (discussing a prison's inmate-correspondence rule that
violated First Amendment rights of nonprisoners to receive correspondence from
inmates).
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student creates or accesses the online speech at school.",' Instead of
focusing on the geographic location of online speech, another way to craft a
rule as to the limits of school jurisdiction over Fraser-type speech is to
"conceiv[e] of Cyberspace as a distinct 'place' for purposes of legal analysis
by recognizing a legally significant border between Cyberspace and the
'real world."'" Although students may access online speech at school,
online speech is not "within" the schoolhouse gate. Caselaw applying
Fraser provides support for this rule.
III. FRASER DOES NOT APPLY TO ONLINE SPEECH, ON- OR OFF-CAMPUS.
Lower courts have found that Fraser does not apply to offline, off-
campus speech.'8 This finding is consistent with: (1) Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in Fraser in which he expressly stated Fraser's speech
would be protected outside the school environment84 and (2) the Morse
majority's statement that Fraser's speech "would have been protected"
outside the school context.185 But does Fraser apply to online, off-campus
speech? What about online, on-campus speech?
Cases analyzing online, Fraser-type speech usually highlight the off-
campus nature of the speech. Several cases have found that Fraser does
not apply to online, off-campus speech,186 but others reach the opposite
conclusion.lsn In Layshock, a Third Circuit panel affirmed that Fraser does
not apply to online, off-campus speech. On the same day, a different Third
Circuit panel declined to apply the Fraser analysis to this issue in Blue
181. See Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 799-800 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
The rule articulated in this Article does not prevent a school from disciplining a
student for violating a school's computer use policy, it merely prevents it from
disciplining the student for the content created or accessed in violation of this policy.
See Papandrea, supra note 34, at 1091 ("If schools are concerned about the mere use of
digital media while students are in school, they can restrict access to the school
computers or ban the use of cell phones and other electronic devices during school
hours without running afoul of the First Amendment."). If the content created or
accessed is merely offensive and does not cause a substantial disruption, the discipline
must be based on a violation of the school's policy, not the content. Id. at 1093.
182. Johnson & Post, supra note 52, at 1378.
183. See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 216 (3d Cir.
2001).
184. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
185. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,405 (2007).
186. See infra Part III.B.
187. See infra Parts III.C-D.
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Mountain, even though the district court found that Fraser does apply to
online, off-campus speech. Because Doninger was before the Second
Circuit in 2008 on an appeal from a denial of a preliminary injunction
against the school, it had a chance to address whether a school may punish
a student for inappropriate comments made off campus on a blog. The
court stated, however, that it was not clear whether Fraser applies to off-
campus speech and determined Tinker appropriately governed the case.188
Because Doninger is currently before the Second Circuit on a certified
question that directly addresses whether schools have jurisdiction over
inappropriate online student speech and because Layshock and Blue
Mountain are currently pending as a consolidated en banc rehearing before
the Third Circuit, these courts will most likely directly address whether
Fraser applies to online, off-campus student speech.
Analyzing these cases and earlier cases shows Fraser cannot be
applied to online, off-campus speech without extending Fraser beyond the
rule created by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the cases show that under a
faithful application of Fraser, schools lack jurisdiction over online, Fraser-
type speech regardless of whether it occurs on or off campus. Establishing
this bright-line rule helps protect students' First Amendment free speech
rights and provides notice to schools that they do not have jurisdiction over
online student speech merely because it is offensive, or merely because
students access or create the speech on-campus.
A. Fraser Does Not Apply to Offline, Off-Campus Speech
Cases involving off-campus, offline speech provide persuasive support
for the rule that Fraser does not apply to online speech. Saxe v. State
College Area School District is a Third Circuit opinion that involved a
school's antiharassment policy.189  Plaintiffs challenged the policy as
overbroad because it could be read to prohibit them from expressing their
religious belief that homosexuality is a sin.190 Then-Circuit Judge Alito
authored the opinion, holding the antiharassment policy violated the First
Amendment on overbreadth grounds.191 The court rejected Fraser as a
basis to sustain the policy because Fraser applies to "speech in school,"192
188. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
189. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2001).
190. Id. at 203-04. Plaintiffs also brought a void-for-vagueness challenge, but
the court did not reach the merits of this claim, resting its holding on the policy being
unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 214.
191. Id. at 202, 214.
192. Id. at 213 ("According to Fraser, then, there is no First Amendment
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but the school's antiharassment policy lacked "any geographical or
contextual limitations" 193 and "could even be read to cover conduct
occurring outside of school premises." 194 The opinion. even indicates that
some on-campus speech is not subject to Fraser; speech in the hall between
classes differs from speech before a captive audience at a school-sponsored
assembly. 195 Then-Circuit Judge Alito's decision in Saxe weighs strongly in
favor of finding Fraser inapplicable to online speech because it recognizes
that Fraser does not even apply to on-campus speech when there is no
captive audience. 196
Riggan v. Midland Independent School District also supports the
finding that online speech is beyond the scope of Fraser. In Riggan, the
plaintiff possessed two pictures taken off campus that depicted the
principal's car parked on a public street in front of a teacher's house. 97
The principal had been under investigation for alleged sexual
improprieties.198 During the court proceedings, the principal alleged the
student planned to use one of the photographs to make a T-shirt with the
caption, "I never had sex with that woman," and the T-shirts would be
distributed at graduation. 199 The court noted if evidence existed of the
alleged plan to distribute T-shirts with the photo and the caption at
graduation, the School District might have a claim under Fraser, but "there
[was] no evidence at [that] point that any of [the student's] expressive
conduct occurred as part of school sponsored activities."200 That such
speech did not occur online makes no difference. Thus, Riggan shows
Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech.2 01
Finally, Klein v. Smith supports the position Fraser does not apply to
online speech.202 In Klein, the school suspended a student for ten days
because he gestured the middle finger to a teacher while in a restaurant
protection for 'lewd,' 'vulgar,' 'indecent,' and 'plainly offensive' speech in school.").
193. Id. at 216.
194. Id. at 216 n.11.
195. See id. at 216.
196. See id.
197. See Riggan v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F. Supp. 2d 647, 650 (W.D.
Tex. 2000).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 651.
200. Id. at 660-61.
201. Cf. id. at 660 (noting the student's only expressive activity that had
occurred was the taking and possessing of photographs off campus).
202. Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Me. 1986).
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parking lot, even though the incident occurred during nonschool hours and
was not in connection with any school activity.203 Although Klein was
decided approximately one month before the Supreme Court issued Fraser
and does not discuss Fraser, the court did address a school rule that
prohibited vulgar conduct towards a staff member.2 04 The court reasoned
any connection between the incident in the restaurant parking lot and
orderly operation of the school was "far too attenuated to support
discipline against Klein for violating the rule prohibiting vulgar or
discourteous conduct toward a teacher."2 05 Klein's reasoning is consistent
with Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Fraser and the Morse
majority's dicta that a school lacks jurisdiction if a Fraser-type speech is
delivered outside the school environment.
Should it matter if the student gestures the middle finger in a
restaurant parking lot or in an online forum? Coy v. Board of Education of
the North Canton City Schools shows the result is the same if a depiction of
the gesture occurs online.206
B. Fraser Does Not Apply to Online, Off-Campus Speech
In Coy, a student created a website at home that contained some
profanity, pictures of boys gesturing the middle finger, and "a sentence
describing one boy as being sexually aroused by his mother." 207 The school
discovered that Coy accessed the website while at school in the computer
lab.20 8 Initially, the school suspended Coy for four days, but then it
expelled him for eighty days.209 After the board of education upheld the
punishment, Coy's parents filed suit against the School alleging it had
violated Coy's First Amendment rights.210 The court expressly found
Fraser inapplicable, even though the student accessed his website at school,
because "Coy was not speaking or attempting to speak in front of a captive
student audience." 211 Additionally, the Coy Court found the school policy
203. Id. at 1440-41.
204. Id. at 1441.
205. Id.
206. See Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 795, 801 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(finding that in order to discipline Coy, the school must show an interference with
school operations under Tinker).
207. Id. at 795.
208. Id. at 795-96.
209. Id. at 796.
210. Id. at 797.
211. Id. at 799-800 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
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prohibiting "inappropriate" conduct unconstitutionally overbroad and
impermissibly vague because the scope of the rule applied to speech
outside school property or at non-school-sponsored events.212  Coy
provides support for the rule that Fraser does not apply to online speech,
even when accessed on-campus, because there is no captive audience.213
Together, Klein and Coy establish consistent treatment of Fraser to both
online and offline speech.
Killion v. Franklin Regional School District followed Klein in finding
Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech. 2 14 In Killion, a student created
a top-ten list that derided the school athletic director.215 The student
created this list on his home computer and emailed it to other students
from home.216 When the list was brought to the attention of school
officials, the school suspended its creator for ten days because it contained
offensive remarks and was found on school grounds.217 The student filed
suit against the school district, and the court granted summary judgment in
his favor. 218 In analyzing Fraser, the court found that the case did not apply
because the student created the list at home and the school lacked
jurisdiction to punish him for this off-campus, online speech, despite
another student bringing a copy of the top-ten list onto school grounds. 219
Killion shows a content creator cannot be punished when someone else is
responsible for bringing a copy of the speech onto school grounds.220
Additionally, Killion followed Saxe and found that the school policy used
to punish the student was unconstitutionally overbroad because it covered
683, 685 (1986)).
212. Id. at 801-03.
213. See id. at 799.
214. See Killion v. Franklin Reg'1 Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 456-58 (W.D.
Pa. 2001).
215. Id. at 448.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 449.
218. Id. at 449, 458.
219. Id. at 456-58 ("Although we agree that several passages from the list are
lewd, abusive, and derogatory, we cannot ignore the fact that the relevant speech, like
that in Klein and Thomas, occurred within the confines of [the student's] home, far
removed from any school premises or facilities.").
220. Id. at 458. Although the court seemed willing to apply Fraser if the
content creator himself brought the top-ten list onto school grounds, this dicta does not
comport with the captive-audience requirement of Fraser. "Given the out of school
creation of the list, absent evidence that [the content creator] was responsible for
bringing the list on school grounds ... defendants could not, without violating the First
Amendment, suspend [him] for the mere creation of the ... Top Ten list." Id.
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speech occurring outside the "school premises." 221  Killion and Saxe
demonstrate consistent treatment of school policies related to off-campus
speech, regardless of whether it occurred online or offline, just as Klein and
Coy exhibit consistent treatment of Fraser to middle-finger gestures,
regardless of whether the speech occurred online or offline.
Emmett v. Kent School District suggests Fraser should not apply to
online speech that occurs outside the school setting, even if it relates to the
school. 2 2 Apparently inspired by a creative writing class assignment, a
student posted mock obituaries of two friends on a website he created.223
A television news program aired a story about the student's "tongue-in-
cheek" webpage but missed the joke.2 24 The news program sensationalized
the story by referring to the webpage as a "hit list"-possibly because
visitors were allowed to vote on the subject of the next obituary-even
though that phrase did not appear on the student's webpage.2 5 As a result
of this online speech, the school quickly expelled the student, but it later
reduced the punishment to a suspension. 226 The student filed suit against
the school district, and the court granted his motion for a temporary
restraining order.227
In analyzing the school's jurisdiction over the student's online speech,
the court found that Fraser did not apply because the speech did not occur
before a captive audience. 228 Also, the court cited Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in Fraser to show Fraser does not apply outside the
school setting.229 The court rejected the idea that school jurisdiction existed
over the online speech merely because the speech may come on campus or
is directed toward the school community.230 It reasoned, "Although the
intended audience was undoubtedly connected to Kentlake High School,
221. Id. at 459 (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir.
2001)).
222. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D.
Wash. 2000) ("Concurring, Justice Brennan pointed out that Fraser does not suggest
that the student's speech would be grounds for punishment if it was given outside the
school setting." (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986))).
223. Id. at 1089.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1090.
228. Id. ("In the present case, Plaintiff's speech was not at a school assembly,
as in Fraser .....
229. Id.
230. See id.
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the speech was entirely outside of the school's supervision or control." 231
This finding is important because the school-defendants in Layshock, Blue
Mountain, and Doninger seek to expand school jurisdiction over online
speech when it relates to the school.
Requa v. Kent School District is unique because the school expressly
declined to discipline the student for his online speech-posting a video on
YouTube. 23 2 In Requa, students surreptitiously filmed their teacher in the
classroom. 233 The recording included sexually suggestive images, such as a
closeup of the teacher's buttocks and one student gesturing a pelvic thrust
toward the teacher while her back was turned. 234 One of the students later
posted the video on YouTube.235 After a local news channel discovered the
video online, it contacted the school for comment. 236 Upon learning of the
video, the school board issued forty-day suspensions to all students
involved.237 In determining the students' punishment, the school board
expressly stated it based the punishment on the in-class conduct, "not for
the purpose of regulating 'speech' created off-campus." 238 Nonetheless, the
student that posted a link to the video on YouTube filed suit for a
temporary restraining order, claiming the school violated his First
Amendment rights.239 In litigation, the School District maintained its
position that it could not regulate the student's online speech: "His
admitted free speech activities outside the classroom-posting a link to the
YouTube video on the internet-are protected speech and the school
district agrees that he may not be disciplined for this out-of-school
expression of his viewpoint."240 The court denied the student's motion for
a temporary restraining order, reasoning the student failed to demonstrate
"that his punishment [was] for his protected free speech and not for the
classroom conduct of which he [was] accused." 241
231. Id.
232. Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274, 1277 (W.D.
Wash. 2007).
233. Id. at 1274.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1275. The school agreed to reduce the punishments to twenty days
if the students wrote a research paper while suspended. Id.
238. Id. at 1276 (citation omitted).
239. Id. at 1273-74.
240. Id. at 1283.
241. Id.
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Finally, Bowler v. Town of Hudson illustrates information specifying
the online location of speech is not subject to Fraser, even when that
information appears on posters displayed on school grounds. 242 In Bowler,
high schoolers in the Conservative Club displayed posters in school to
advertise their group.243 The posters included the website address for the
national organization. 244 The national organization's website contained
links to websites with videos of hostage beheadings in Iraq and
Afghanistan. 245 The school removed the posters based on the graphic
nature of the videos linked to the national organization's website.246 In
rejecting the School's defense that it was permitted to censor such speech
under Fraser, the court reasoned, "[B]ecause the graphic and arguably
'offensive' speech was not actually displayed at school, Fraser does not
support the school's censorship." 247
Other courts have also refused to apply Fraser to online speech. 248
While these cases mainly focus on online, off-campus speech, they support
a rule that prohibits school jurisdiction under Fraser, regardless of whether
it occurs online or offline. Requa shows at least one school district
acknowledged it did not have Fraser-jurisdiction over online speech.249 Coy
shows merely accessing one's own website at school does not create Fraser-
242. Bowler v. Town of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168, 177-78 (D. Mass. 2007).
243. Id. at 171-73.
244. Id. at 173.
245. Id. at 171, 173. The court stated Fraser applies to speech that is "'sexually
explicit, indecent, or lewd."' Id. at 176 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 683-84 (1986)). It acknowledged, "Several courts have read Fraser to support
censorship of student speech that was not 'lewd, vulgar, or obscene' but that could
reasonably be interpreted to promote illegal or 'immoral' activities, including suicide,
murder and drugs." Id. at 179 (citations omitted). See also supra notes 110, 128, 130
(providing more examples of what type of speech is subject to Fraser).
246. Bowler, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 173.
o247. Id. at 179 (citing Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 799-800 (N.D.
Ohio 2002)).
248. See Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367, 1374, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
(denying a principal's motion to dismiss and refusing to apply Fraser to a Facebook
page a student created at home, and stating, "For the Court to equate a school
assembly to the entire internet would set a precedent too far reaching"); Flaherty v.
Keystone Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700, 706 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (granting
summary judgment in favor of the student, and holding the school policies were
"unconstitutionally overbroad and vague because they permit a school official to
discipline a student for an abusive, offensive, harassing or inappropriate expression
that occurs outside of school premises and not tied to a school related activity").
249. Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276-78 (W.D.
Wash. 2007).
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jurisdiction.25 0 Killion suggests when someone other than the creator of the
online speech brings a physical copy of the speech on campus, the school
cannot punish the content creator, absent other factors. 25 1 The court in
Bowler held that displaying a website address on a poster in a school
hallway did not create Fraser-jurisdiction based on the website's content.252
Emmett demonstrates that a school does not have jurisdiction over online
speech merely because the speech relates to the school.5 3
Because Fraser requires a captive audience and there are no captive
audiences online, creating a jurisdictional border between cyberspace and
real space is a legitimate, workable, and appropriate solution in the context
of student-speech doctrine, at least under Fraser. Utilizing Fraser in online
speech cases would require an expansion of that doctrine. In 2002, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did expand Fraser by applying its standard to
online, off-campus speech?-4
C. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Concededly Expands Fraser-
Jurisdiction over Online Speech
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District involved an eighth-grade
student that created a website entitled "Teacher Sux" at home during
nonschool hours. 55 The website, mainly describing the student's algebra
teacher and principal, included the words, "F You Mrs. Fulmer. You
Are A B . You Are A Stupid B ," 136 times.256 The website also
included a section entitled "Why Should She Die?" and asked readers to
provide twenty dollars to help pay for the hitman, but it listed no address
by which to provide funds to the student. 57 The website included a
disclaimer and a clickwrap agreement requiring visitors to agree they were
not school-district "staff," and they would not inform school-district
employees about the website. 258 The student who created the website
showed it to one other student while at school and told others who later
250. See Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 799-800.
251. See Killion v. Franklin Reg'1 Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454-58 (W.D.
Pa. 2001).
252. Bowler, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 177-80.
253. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D.
Wash. 2000).
254. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 867-69 (Pa. 2002).
255. Id. at 850-51.
256. Id. at 851.
257. Id. at 851, 859.
258. Id. at 851.
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viewed it.259
Upon discovery of the website, the principal informed local police
and the FBI, but these law enforcement agencies declined to file charges
against the student after an investigation. 260 The algebra teacher said the
website frightened her and caused her injuries, including loss of sleep, loss
of appetite, and anxiety.261 She did not return to finish the school year.2 62
Initially, the school suspended the student for three days, but then it later
extended the suspension to ten days and eventually voted to expel the
student.263 The school based its punishment on school-district policies that
prohibited students from threatening and harassing teachers and principals,
as well as making statements of disrespect that "result[ed] in actual harm
to the health, safety, and welfare of the school community."264
The student, through his parents, filed suit against the School District
alleging it violated the student's First Amendment rights.265 The trial court
affirmed the punishment. 266 In a two-to-one decision, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's decision.267 The dissenting judge stated that the
School failed to establish the existence of a true threat.268 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied both Fraser and Tinker, but stated
it need not definitively decide which doctrine applied because the School
District prevailed under either test, even though the student created the
website off campus during nonschool hours.269
259. Id. at 852.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 852-53.
264. Id. at 853.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 426-29 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000) (Friedman, J., dissenting), aff'd, 807 A.2d 847. Judge Friedman found no true
threat because local authorities and the FBI decided not to press charges, and because
the school itself did not perceive the website as a true threat. Id. at 426-27.
269. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 866-68 ("Yet, whether the facts
before us are more aligned with the events in Fraser and governed by the lewd and
plainly offensive speech analysis, or are more akin to the situation in Tinker and thus
subject to review for substantial disruption of the work of the school, we need not
definitively decide, for application of either case results in a determination in favor of
the School District. Thus, we will first apply Fraser, and then Tinker to the facts sub
judice.").
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In analyzing Fraser, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reasoned
that while the student created the website off campus, it became on-campus
speech by his actions of: (1) accessing the website at school; (2) showing
the website to another student; and (3) informing other students about the
website.27 0 The court held, "[W]here speech that is aimed at a specific
school and/or its personnel is brought onto the school campus or accessed
at school by its originator, the speech will be considered on-campus
speech." 27 1 While the Bethlehem Court considered the "on-campus" nature
of the speech a "strong factor" in its analysis, it did not foreclose applying
Fraser to a student's purely off-campus, online speech.27 2
Even accepting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's finding that the
student's website became on-campus speech, its application of Fraser to
online speech is tenuous because the court broadened the scope of Fraser.
Unlike Fraser, Bethlehem did not involve a captive audience at a
mandatory school assembly.273 Indeed, the Bethlehem Court acknowledged
its expansion of Fraser: "[Q]uestions exist as to the applicability of Fraser
to the instant factual scenario." 274 This conceded expansion of Fraser
makes Bethlehem of limited value when considering whether Fraser applies
to online speech, but it sets a dangerous precedent for the expansion of
school jurisdiction over online student speech.
D. Recent Second and Third Circuit Cases Consider Whether Fraser
Applies to Online Student Speech
An analysis of the three recent federal circuit cases involving Fraser
shows it does not apply and should not be expanded to apply to online
student speech; however, this rule is not yet clearly established.
270. See id. at 865.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 865 n.12 ("While the fact that J.S. personally accessed his website on
school grounds is a strong factor in our assessment, we do not discount that one who
posts school-targeted material in a manner known to be freely accessible from school
grounds may run the risk of being deemed to have engaged in on-campus speech,
where actual accessing by others in fact occurs, depending upon the totality of the
circumstances involved.").
273. See Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 (9th Cir.
1985), rev'd and remanded, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at
850-52.
274. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 868.
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1. The Easy Case
Regardless of the fundamental point that Fraser does not apply
absent a captive audience where a school needs to disassociate itself from
lewd or indecent sexual speech, Doninger v. Niehoff is a clear example of a
court misapplying Fraser.275 Doninger is an easy case because it involves
political speech.
In Doninger, a Connecticut high school prohibited a student-the
junior class secretary-from running for senior class secretary based on
comments she made online and off campus after school hours.276 The
student, Avery Doninger, posted comments on her publicly accessible blog
referring to school administrators as "douchebags in central office," and
she encouraged readers to contact the school superintendent "to piss her
off more." 277 Doninger posted these comments in response to the school's
decision to cancel or reschedule the music festival and to influence
members of the public to express their opposition to school officials. 278
Prior to her blog post, Doninger and three student council members
sent an email to a number of local taxpayers informing them of the music
festival situation and requesting they contact the school superintendent. 279
275. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008).
276. Id. at 43.
277. Id. at 45. The Second Circuit reproduced the following from Doninger's
blog post:
"[Jiamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. [Hiere is an email
that we sent to a ton of people and asked them to forward to everyone in their
address book to help get support for [Jamfest. [B]asically, because we sent it
out, [the superintendent] is getting a TON of phone calls and emails and such.
[W]e have so much support and we really appriciate [sic] it. [H]owever, she
got pissed off and decided to just cancel the whole thing all together. [A]anddd
[sic] so basically we aren't going to have it at all, but in the slightest chance we
do it is going to be after the talent show on [M]ay 18th. [A]ndd..here [sic] is
the letter we sent out to parents.
And here is a letter my mom sent to [the superintendent] and cc'd [the
principal] to get an idea of what to write if you want to write something or call
her to piss her off more. [I']m down."
Id.
278. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 205-07 (D. Conn. 2007),
aff'd, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
279. Id.
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The principal and superintendent decided "appealing directly to the public
was not an appropriate means of resolving complaints the students had
regarding school administrators' decisions." 2 0 The principal met with
Doninger prior to Doninger's blog post and informed her that appealing to
the public was not appropriate.281 Later that night, Doninger posted the
comments on her blog.282
School administrators did not discover Doninger's blog until after the
music-festival issue was resolved.283 However, the school still punished
Doninger by prohibiting her from running for senior class secretary.284 The
school admitted in an email to Avery's mother that it punished Doninger
because of her online, off campus comments and her failure to follow the
principal's prior instruction regarding the impropriety of contacting the
public to resolve disagreements with school administrators. 285
Doninger filed a lawsuit against the principal and superintendent for
violation of her First Amendment free speech rights.286 She sought a
preliminary injunction to force "the school to remove the current Senior
Class Secretary" and allow Avery to run in a new election.2n Doninger
argued the Tinker standard should apply, thus requiring the school to
establish that Avery's conduct created a substantial disruption on
campus.288 The principal and superintendent argued Fraser should apply
because of the vulgar and offensive nature of the speech.289 The district
280. Id. at 207.
281. Id. at 205.
282. Id. at 206.
283. Id. at 207.
284. Id. Principal Niehoff also instructed Avery to show the post to her
mother, apologize to Superintendent Schwartz, and recuse herself from the senior class
secretary race. Id. Avery agreed to the first two requests but declined to recuse herself
from the class secretary race. Id. She won a plurality of the vote by write-in votes but
was not permitted to take office. Id. at 208-09.
285. Id. at 209.
286. Id. at 211. Doninger claimed the school violated her First Amendment
rights by refusing to let her: (1) run for class secretary; (2) wear a "Team Avery" T-
shirt into the auditorium when students running for student government were giving
campaign speeches; and (3) speak at the student government campaign-speech
assembly. Id. Avery also brought an equal protection claim alleging the school treated
her differently than other students who participated in an email to community
members asking them to contact the school to help prevent the music festival from
being canceled or rescheduled again. Id. at 219.
287. See id. at 210.
288. See id. at 212.
289. Id. at 212-13.
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court denied the preliminary injunction because it found Doninger did not
have a likelihood of success on the merits.291
In denying Doninger's motion for a preliminary injunction, the court
first sought to distinguish both Tinker and Fraser based on the type of
punishment Doninger received. 29 1  The district court unpersuasively
reasoned that Tinker and Fraser did not apply because those cases involved
suspensions from school, whereas here the school merely prohibited
Doninger from participating in a voluntary, extracurricular activity.292 The
district court found that voluntary, extracurricular activities are a privilege,
not a right; thus, the school could preclude her from participating in this
activity without violating her rights.293 The court continued, however, by
290. Id. at 218.
291. See id. at 213-16.
292. Id. at 216 ("[Doninger] does not have a First Amendment right to run for
a voluntary extracurricular position as a student leader while engaging in uncivil and
offensive communications regarding school administrators."). Id. In distinguishing
between voluntary, extracurricular activities and suspensions, the court relied on
Lowery v. Euverard. Id. at 215-16 (citing Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir.
2007)). This reliance is misplaced because Lowery applied Tinker and found a
reasonable forecast of a substantial disruption to the high school football team based
on a petition by some of the players to remove their head coach. Id. at 215. However,
the district court in Doninger claimed it could preclude Doninger from running for
student government because voluntary, extracurricular activities are a privilege, not a
right. Id. (citing Lowery, 497 F.3d at 594). Thus, Lowery does not support the
reasoning by the Doninger District Court. Whether the distinction between punishing
a student via suspension or preclusion from voluntary, extracurricular activities
provides a sound legal distinction for punishing a student based on her off-campus-or
on-campus-speech is beyond the scope of this Article. That being said, if the speech
at issue is constitutionally protected and not subject to any of the current student-
speech doctrines, the type of punishment-whether it is a ban on extracurricular
activity, suspension, or another form of discipline-should not matter. In any case, the
school is still punishing a student for speech.
293. Id. at 213-14. The Second Circuit also reached the questionable
conclusion that preventing a student from participating in a voluntary, extracurricular
activity is materially different than suspension or expulsion, but not under a "privilege
versus right" analysis. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 52-53 (2d Cir. 2008). Rather,
the Second Circuit considered the punishment permissible under Tinker. Id. The
Second Circuit reasoned Doninger's speech risked: (1) disruption of the resolution of
the music-festival-scheduling dispute and (2) "frustration of the proper operation of
LMHS's student government and undermining of the values that student government,
as an extracurricular activity, is designed to promote." Id. (citing Doninger, 514 F.
Supp. 2d at 215). It is difficult to understand how the Second Circuit used this
distinction as a basis to support its substantial-disruption analysis. The school resolved
the music-festival-scheduling issue prior to discovering the existence of Doninger's
blog post. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 207. Failing to discover the blog post prior to
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discussing Tinker and Fraser and found that the facts more closely
resembled Fraser.2 94
While the district court recognized that, unlike in Fraser, Doninger's
speech occurred off campus, it provided three bases for applying Fraser to
her online, off-campus speech. First, the court considered it material the
speech "was purposely designed by [Doninger] to come onto the
campus." 295 Second, the court relied on a 2007 Second Circuit case that
applied Tinker to online, off-campus speech.2 96 Third, the court relied on
Morse as support for extending Fraser to prohibit vulgar and offensive
language that occurs off campus.297 Each of these bases is questionable,
especially relying on Morse.
First, the district court's reliance on Morse to deny the preliminary
injunction in Doninger is highly questionable because it fails to consider
the express limitations set forth in Justice Alito's concurring opinion, 298 as
well as the Morse majority's dicta on the limits of Fraser.2 99 The court in
Morse held that during a school-sponsored event, a school may prohibit
speech that could reasonably be interpreted to advocate illegal drug use.30o
Unlike Morse, Doninger's speech did not occur at a school-sponsored
resolution of the scheduling issue leans heavily, if not dispositively, in favor of finding
Doninger's blog post did not cause a substantial disruption to the school environment.
Also, it strains reason to claim Doninger's blog post risked frustrating the purposes of
student government, even assuming "frustration of the proper operation" of student
government is sufficient to establish a substantial disruption or reasonable forecast of
the same. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 52. Doninger won the election as a write-in candidate,
and the record is devoid of evidence her participation in the race caused a substantial
disruption or reasonable forecast of the same.
294. Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
295. Id.
296. Id. (citing Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007)).
297. See id. at 217 ("Fraser and Morse teach that school officials could
permissibly punish [Doninger] in the way that they did for her offensive speech in the
blog, which interfered with the school's 'highly appropriate function ... to prohibit the
use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse . . . ."' (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986))).
298. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423-25 (2007) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
299. See id. at 409 (majority opinion) ("[Fraser] should not be read to
encompass any speech that could fit under some definition of 'offensive.' After all,
much political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to some.").
300. Id. at 397 ("[W]e hold that schools may take steps to safeguard those
entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging
illegal drug use.").
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event, let alone advocate illegal drug use. 301 Doninger created the blog post
at home during nonschool hours.302 Even the Morse majority noted that
Fraser is limited to on-campus or school-sponsored events.303
Equally important, Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Morse,
joined by Justice Kennedy, expressly limited the scope of the holding in at
least two ways and made clear he did not support further extension of
Morse to other categories of speech.30 First, Justice Alito stated the Morse
holding is limited to speech that advocates illegal drug use, and he would
not prohibit political or social commentary advocating against the war on
drugs or in support of legalizing marijuana.305 Second, Justice Alito stated
Morse does not support the position that schools may prohibit a student's
speech simply because the speech may interfere with the school's
educational mission. 306 Such a broad, vague standard is likely to chill free
speech. This analysis is consistent with then-Circuit Judge Alito's
reasoning in Saxe, in which he expressed concerns that a school had
interpreted an antiharassment policy to prohibit a student from expressing
his religious belief that homosexuality is a sin.30 7 For Justice Alito and
Justice Kennedy, Morse's holding is specifically limited to speech that
could reasonably be interpreted as advocating illegal drug use, and this rule
is "standing at the far reaches of what the First Amendment permits." 308
301. See Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 206, affd, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
302. Id.
303. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 405.
304. See id. at 422, 425 (Alito, J., concurring).
305. Id. at 422.
306. Id. at 423.
307. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 203, 214-17 (3d Cir.
2001).
308. Morse, 551 U.S. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring). Although Justice Alito's
concurrence specifically limited the scope of Morse, some lower courts have already
exceeded that scope by applying Morse to cases outside the context of speech that
could reasonably be viewed as advocating illegal drug use. See, e.g., Ponce v. Socorro
Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 770-72 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Morse to a high school
sophomore who penned a diary entry describing a Columbine-like shooting at his
school); Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 980-81, 984 (11th Cir. 2007)
(applying Morse to a high school student who described killing her math teacher in her
notebook); see also Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower
Courts: Stretching the High Court's Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) ("The bottom line is that while some federal judges and
courts acknowledge the narrow nature of the holding in Morse, others are expansively
interpreting it by choosing to ignore both its idiosyncratic facts and Justice Alito's very
precise, limiting language cited earlier." (citation omitted)).
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Morse does not support the district court's analysis.
Second, the district court's reliance on Wisniewski is also
questionable. Although Wisniewski involved online, off-campus speech,
the Second Circuit applied Tinker, not Fraser, and found that the off-
campus speech created a foreseeable risk of a substantial disruption on
campus.309 In Wisniewski, an eighth-grade student electronically sent an
image he created at home to his friends via instant messenger.3 10 The
image depicted one of his teachers and suggested the teacher be shot and
killed.311 The school suspended the student for one semester, and the court
upheld the suspension under Tinker.312 The court reasoned that the online,
off-campus speech could create a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial
disruption at school once it became known to the teacher and other school
officials.313 As made clear by Justice Brennan's concurrence in Fraser and
dicta by the majority in Morse, the Fraser test simply does not apply to off-
campus speech-even if Tinker does-because there is no captive school
audience.314 Wisniewski is not relevant caselaw for a Fraser analysis, which
requires a captive audience and the need for a school to dissociate itself
from a student's lewd and indecent sexual speech.315 Because these factors
were not present in Wisniewski, it does not support extending Fraser to
apply to online speech.
Third, although Doninger is not alone in considering whether online,
off-campus speech is "purposely designed" or reasonably likely to "come
onto campus,"316 this factor alone is an insufficient basis to support
punishing a student's off-campus speech, regardless of whether Fraser or
Tinker applies. 317  The mere fact that speech "comes onto campus"
309. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2007).
310. Id. at 35-36.
311. Id. at 36.
312. Id. at 37-40.
313. Id.
314. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404-05 (2007); Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 n.1 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring).
315. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86.
316. See, e.g., J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. Feb.
4, 2010) ("[O]ff-campus speech that causes or reasonably threatens to cause a
substantial disruption of or material interference with a school need not satisfy any
geographical technicality in order to be regulated pursuant to Tinker."), vacated, reh'g
en banc granted, No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
317. See Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D.
Wash. 2000) ("Although the intended audience was undoubtedly connected to
Kentlake High School, the speech was entirely outside of the school's supervision or
146 [Vol. 59
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certainly does not satisfy the Tinker test because it fails to consider whether
a substantial disruption occurs or is reasonably forecast to occur. 18 Indeed,
the court in Coy ruled that the student could not be punished merely for
accessing a website at school if such access did not create a substantial
disruption.319  Chief Justice Zappala, concurring in Bethlehem, also
cautioned that merely accessing online speech at school does not
automatically transform it into on-campus speech.320 As noted, Fraser is
limited to captive audiences at school or school-sponsored events. There is
no captive audience in the context of accessing one's own website at
school.3 21 Even if a person receives a text message, an e-mail, or some
other form of digital communication while at school, that recipient is not a
captive audience like the one in Fraser because the recipient can delete the
communication, usually without viewing it.
Doninger appealed the denial of her preliminary injunction motion,
and the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, but not under
Fraser.322 The Second Circuit expressly refrained from deciding whether
Fraser applied to off-campus speech. 323 Instead, the court applied Tinker
and held that the school met its burden of establishing "a foreseeable risk
of a substantial disruption."3 24 On remand, the parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment.325 Although the Second Circuit applied Tinker and
expressly declined to address whether Fraser applied to online, off-campus
speech, the district court reiterated its position that Fraser does apply to
such speech, or at least that the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity because Doninger's constitutional right to such speech had not
control.").
318. See Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 801 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(finding accessing a website did not 'materially and substantially interfere[] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school"' (quoting Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969))).
319. Id. (disallowing summary judgment for either party because a material
issue of fact existed as to whether accessing the website at school caused a substantial
disruption under Tinker).
320. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 870 (Pa. 2002) (Zappala,
C.J., concurring).
321. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 799-800 (holding Fraser does not apply to a
website a student created off campus but accessed at school because, in part, no captive
audience existed).
322. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49-50, 54 (2d Cir. 2008).
323. Id. at49.
324. Id. at 50-53.
325. Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (D. Conn. 2009).
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been clearly established. 326 Thus, on the First Amendment claim related to
the blog post, the district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants based on qualified immunity.327
The Second Circuit has another chance to address whether Fraser
applies to online speech. Subsequent to granting summary judgment to the
Doninger defendants based on qualified immunity and finding that Fraser
applied to Doninger's online speech, the district court certified the
following question to the Second Circuit: "Whether a school may
discipline a student for inappropriate comments made off campus on a
blog, or whether school officials have qualified immunity in such situations,
presents controlling questions of law regarding the First Amendment." 328
In certifying this question, the district court reasoned there is "'substantial
ground for difference of opinion"' as to whether Fraser applies to off-
campus, online speech because the question remains undecided by the
Second Circuit, and lower courts are in "disarray" when analyzing such
speech.3 29
In answering the certified question, the Second Circuit should
consider the following. First, the Second Circuit should look to its 1979
decision, Thomas v. Board of Education, for guidance. Thomas involved
an off-campus newspaper that focused on sexual satire.330 Although the
students produced the publication off campus, copies were stored on-
campus in a classroom closet with a teacher's consent. 31 After being
suspended, the students sued the school board and administrators, alleging
the punishment violated their First Amendment rights.332 The Second
326. Id. at 221 ("To be sure, the fact that the Second Circuit declined to
address Fraser in its decision might have been intended to gently telegraph to the
Court that it erred in its analysis of Fraser. However, even if Fraser does not apply to
off-campus speech, the Court believes that Defendants would still enjoy qualified
immunity because the constitutional right at stake was not clearly established at the
time the alleged violation occurred.").
327. Id. at 224.
328. Doninger v. Niehoff, No. 3:07CV1129 (MRK), 2009 WL 1364890, at *2
(D. Conn. May 14, 2009).
329. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006)).
330. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 1979).
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1046. Initially, the principal and superintendent agreed to take no
action against the students based on the publication. Id. at 1045-46. When the school
board president learned about the publication from her son, she expressed
dissatisfaction with the inaction of the principal and the superintendent. Id. at 1046.
Based on the school board president's dissatisfaction, the principal initiated an
148 [Vol. 59
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Circuit held Tinker did not control because the speech here "was
deliberately designed to take place beyond the schoolhouse gate."333 While
the Second Circuit decided this case years before the facts giving rise to
Fraser occurred, Thomas provides support for the position that schools do
not have jurisdiction to regulate indecent speech that occurs off campus.
Judge Newman, however, concurred in the judgment, stating, "The extent
to which school authority might be asserted for off-campus activities need
not be determined, since the school has disclaimed such power." 334 He
seriously doubted schools lacked jurisdiction to discipline students for
distributing vulgar material near the schoolhouse gate.335 Nonetheless, the
majority expressly disagreed with Judge Newman's belief that schools
could regulate vulgar, off-campus speech, even if such expression may
come onto school grounds.3 36
Thomas shows that arguments made by the principal and
superintendent in Doninger are insufficient to create jurisdiction over the
off-campus blog.3m On appeal, the principal and superintendent argue the
school has jurisdiction over Doninger's blog post because it "was purposely
investigation, invited the students' parents to a school board meeting, and eventually
imposed the following punishments based on consultation with the superintendent and
the board of education:
(1) five-day suspensions to be reduced to three days if the student prepared an
essay on "the potential harm to people caused by the publication of
irresponsible and/or obscene writing"; (2) segregation from other students
during study hall periods, throughout the month of February and possibly
longer if an acceptable essay were not submitted; (3) loss of all student
privileges during the period of suspension; and (4) inclusion of suspension
letters in the students' school files.
Id. The differing reactions between the principal and superintendent, on the one hand,
and the board of education president, on the other, exemplifies that even school
administrators disagree about the proper response to offensive, off-campus student
speech.
333. Id. at 1050.
334. Id. at 1058 (Newman, J., concurring).
335. Id. at 1058 n.13.
336. Id. at 1053 n.18 (majority opinion) ("Moreover, we have difficulty with
Judge Newman's footnote suggesting that school officials can regulate allegedly
'indecent' expression by students in the general community. . . . Nevertheless, we
believe that this power is denied to public school officials when they seek to punish off-
campus expression simply because they reasonably foresee that in-school distribution
may result.").
337. Id. at 1051-52.
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designed by [Doninger] to come onto the school campus."33 8 Under
Thomas, schools do not have jurisdiction over lewd and indecent speech
merely because it may come onto campus.33 9
Second, the court should not limit its holding to off-campus, online
speech. The court should create a border between cyberspace and the
physical world by holding that Fraser does not apply to online speech,
regardless of where it is created or accessed. This rule would be consistent
with the Supreme Court's holding in Fraser because of the lack of a captive
audience or the need for the school to disassociate itself from the speech.340
Third, even if the Second Circuit were to mistakenly hold that Fraser
applies to online, off-campus speech, Fraser does not apply to this
particular blog post. Under the Second Circuit's Guiles v. Marineau
precedent, the content of Avery's blog post is not the type of speech
subject to Fraser.341 The single use of the term "douchebag" and the phrase
"piss her off more" is not equivalent to the sexual innuendo in Fraser.
Guiles requires more.342
Finally, Doninger is an easy case compared to the speech at issue in
the subsequently discussed cases. Although Doninger used the term
"douchebag" and the phrase "piss her off more," she engaged in political
speech by soliciting public support to save the music festival from being
rescheduled for a fourth time or being canceled altogether. Doninger's
"purpose in writing a public journal about Jamfest was to encourage
taxpayers in the school district to contact the school's administration and
express support for the event. . . . "343 Not only did she engage in political
speech, Doninger directed her online speech to a nonstudent audience.344
Thus, Doninger involves the First Amendment rights of nonstudents-the
right of citizens to receive political speech about a public high school music
festival.
338. Supplemental Response and Reply Brief of Defendants-
Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 157, at 36.
339. See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1051-52.
340. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684-85 (1986).
341. See Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 327-29 (2d Cir. 2006) (permitting
the school to censor only "student speech that is 'lewd,' 'vulgar,' 'indecent,' or 'plainly
offensive' (citations omitted)).
342. See id. at 329-30; see also supra note 110 and accompanying text.
343. Supplemental Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 29,
at 10 (citation omitted).
344. See id. at 10 n.2.
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2. A Harder Case on the Facts, Not the Law
While Doninger involves political speech that clearly has value, J.S. v.
Blue Mountain School District involves speech that one could reasonably
find has little or no value.3 45 Regardless, under Fraser and well-established
First Amendment doctrine, offensive speech receives constitutional
protection.3 46 That the speaker is a student does not change this result
absent a captive audience and a need for the school to disassociate itself
from the speech.3 4 7 Perhaps recognizing the limits of Fraser, the Third
Circuit Blue Mountain panel applied Tinker to uphold the lower court's
decision that the School had jurisdiction to punish online, off-campus
student speech.3 48 The Blue Mountain panel reached this conclusion even
though: (1) the district court applied Fraser to regulate the speech3 49 and
(2) it agreed with the district court that no actual substantial disruption
occurred.35 0 The Third Circuit's approval of school jurisdiction rested
merely on the purported foreseeable risk of a substantial disruption.3 1
In Blue Mountain, a student and her friend created a parody profile of
their principal that referred to him as a "sex addict" and included language
such as "fucking," "bitch," "fagass," and "dick head."3 52 The district court
found the website had effects on campus because the day after the students
created it, other students were discussing the website at school, one of the
content creators told five to eight students about the website, and "there
was a general 'buzz' in the school" concerning the website.353 The student
received a ten-day suspension for creating the website.35 4
Although the district court noted the facts did not support finding a
345. See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. Feb. 4,
2010), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
346. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681-83 (1986); supra
Part II.
347. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86 (holding a school district may sanction
students using "offensively lewd and indecent speech" in order to disassociate itself
from the conduct).
348. Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d at 298-300.
349. See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at
*5-6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), aff'd, 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010), vacated, reh'g
en banc granted, No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
350. Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d at 299.
351. See id. at 301-02.
352. Id. at 291.
353. Blue Mountain, 2008 WL 4279517, at *1 (citation omitted).
354. Id. at *2.
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substantial disruption under Tinker,3 55 this conclusion mattered little to the
court because it believed Tinker did not apply.3 56 Fraser, however, did
apply.357 The court reasoned that the School could punish the student
because the website contained "vulgar, lewd, and potentially illegal speech
that had an effect on campus."*58 The Blue Mountain district court opinion
is similar to Bethlehem because it applied Fraser to an online, off-campus
website that "came onto" campus. The two cases are different, however,
because the court in Blue Mountain expanded Fraser further than
Bethlehem-there is no evidence the website creator in Blue Mountain
accessed or showed the website to others while at school.3 59  One
interpretation is that the district court faithfully applied Tinker but wanted
to punish the speech and sought to expand Fraser to achieve the desired
result.
In part, the court relied on a 1976 case from the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, Fenton v. Stear.360 In
Fenton, the court upheld the punishment of a student who called a teacher
a "lewd and obscene name" in a public place not connected with a school
activity.3 61 The court reasoned that prohibiting schools from punishing
such off-campus behavior "could lead to devastating consequences in the
school."3 62  The Blue Mountain district court's reliance on Fenton is
questionable for at least two reasons. First, Fenton was decided prior to
Fraser. Thus, Fenton is no longer good law because Fraser requires a
captive audience, as expressed by Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in
Fraser and the Morse majority's dicta.3 63 The Blue Mountain Court
provided no analysis on Fraser's captive-audience factor.64 In Fenton,
355. Id. at *4-5.
356. Id.
357. Id. at *5-6.
358. Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
359. See id. at *1-3.
360. Id. at *7.
361. Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767, 769, 772 (W.D. Pa. 1976). The student
called the teacher a "prick." Id. at 769.
362. Id. at 772.
363. In Blue Mountain, counsel for the student made a very similar argument,
but they went even further by questioning whether Fenton was ever good law. Reply
Brief of Appellants at 10, J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010)
(No. 08-4138) ("Fenton, if it was ever good law, is clearly supplanted by the Supreme
Court's express limitation, set forth in Fraser and Morse, on the ability of school
officials to sanction student speech that occurs away from school.").
364. See Blue Mountain, 2008 WL 4279517, at *6-7, aff'd, 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir.
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there was no captive audience.365 Thus, Fenton is not valid support for
punishing a student's lewd or indecent off-campus speech. The Blue
Mountain district court failed to address this factor.
Second, merely because a student website may have an "effect" on-
campus is an insufficient basis to assert jurisdiction over a student's First
Amendment activity. As far as the off-campus nature of the speech, the
Blue Mountain district court noted that other courts have reached different
conclusions regarding school jurisdiction to punish off-campus, online
speech,3 66 but such decisions were not binding,3 67 or alternatively, the
content in those cases was much less egregious.3 68
Blue Mountain illustrates the reason courts must limit Fraser's
applicability to captive audiences at school. The court found that no actual
substantial disruption occurred on campus as a result of the student's
website.369 Additionally, no evidence suggested the student accessed the
website at school, let alone forced other students to view it at school.3 70 A
school applying Fraser to online speech improperly extends its jurisdiction
over the speech rights of minors and nonstudents. That the speech in Blue
Mountain is not praiseworthy is beside the point. Offensive speech
receives First Amendment protection,37' and schools cannot put cyberspace
Feb. 4, 2010), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
365. See Fenton, 423 F. Supp. at 769-71.
366. Blue Mountain, 2008 WL 4279517, at *7-8 (discussing cases where courts
held schools did not have jurisdiction to punish student speech); Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (finding a student's off-
campus creation of a MySpace profile was not subject to school's jurisdiction), aff'd,
593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 07-4465 (3d Cir.
Apr. 9 2010); Latour v. Riverside Beaver Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 05-1076, 2005 WL
2106562, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2005) (holding rap songs recorded off campus
were not subject to school jurisdiction); Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F.
Supp. 2d 698, 705-06 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (holding a student handbook unconstitutionally
overbroad because it was not geographically limited); Killion v. Franklin Reg'1 Sch.
Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455-58 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (holding a school did not have
jurisdiction over speech created off campus absent evidence it was brought on campus).
367. Blue Mountain, 2008 WL 4279517, at *8 ("To the extent that Killion
stands for the proposition that a school can never discipline a student for lewd and
vulgar speech made off of the school campus, we simply disagree, and Killion is not
binding on this court.").
368. Id. (noting that compared to Layshock, "the facts of our case include a
much more vulgar and offensive profile").
369. Id. at *6-7.
370. See id. at *1-2.
371. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000).
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within the schoolhouse gate merely because the speech has an "effect" on,
or is "aimed at," the school.372
On appeal, the Third Circuit Blue Mountain panel expressly declined
to address whether Fraser applied to online, off-campus speech.37 3 The
court expressly agreed with the district court that no actual substantial
disruption occurred in the school environment.37 4 Nonetheless, a majority
of the panel affirmed the School's right to assert jurisdiction over the
online, off-campus speech because the School could reasonably forecast a
potential substantial disruption.3 75 The majority found the School could
reasonably forecast a substantial disruption because the vulgar nature of
the speech raised questions about the principal's "fitness to hold his
position,"3 76 the speech could cause worry among parents, and the School
would need to take action to alleviate these concerns. 377
The dissenting Blue Mountain judge, Judge Chagares, offers two
reasons the majority's "holding vests school officials with dangerously
overbroad censorship discretion."378  First, forecasting a substantial
disruption based on the online, off-campus profile-especially while
372. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 261, 263 (3d Cir. Feb.
4, 2010) (holding a student's speech on MySpace was afforded First Amendment
protection even though it was aimed at the school district community), vacated, reh'g
en banc granted, No. 07-4465 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
373. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 298 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010)
("We decline today to decide whether a school official may discipline a student for her
lewd, vulgar, or offensive off-campus speech that has an effect on-campus because we
conclude that the profile at issue, though created off campus, falls within the realm of
student speech subject to regulation under Tinker."), vacated, reh'g en banc granted,
No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
374. Id. at 299 ("[W]e would have no trouble concluding, as the District Court
did, that these incidents did not amount to a substantial disruption of the [m]iddle
[sIchool [environment] . . . ."). The incidents not amounting to an actual substantial
disruption were: (1) two teachers quieting their respective classes when students were
discussing the profile; (2) a counselor needing to proctor an exam because the original
proctor attended a meeting regarding the profile; and (3) two students decorating the
lockers of the plaintiff and her cohort upon their return from suspension. Id. at 293-94.
375. Id. at 290 ("Because we believe school authorities could reasonably have
forecasted a substantial disruption of or material interference with the school as a
result of the MySpace profile . . . we conclude that the School District did not violate
J.S.'s First Amendment free speech rights by disciplining her for creating the profile.").
376. Id. at 308 ("[A]llud[ing] to [the principal's] interest or engagement in
sexually inappropriate behavior and illegal conduct . . . threatened to substantially
disrupt the [school]. . .
377. Id. at 303.
378. Id. at 308 (Chagares, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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conceding no actual substantial disruption occurred-is inconsistent with
the high standard set forth in Tinker.379 In Tinker, the Supreme Court
found no reasonable forecast of a substantial disruption when students
wore black armbands at school to protest the highly controversial Vietnam
War.38 0 In Blue Mountain, the majority found a reasonable forecast of a
substantial disruption based on an online profile that, "though indisputably
vulgar, was so juvenile and nonsensical that no reasonable person could
take its content seriously . . . ."381 If Tinker's armband would not create a
reasonable forecast of a substantial disruption, then neither can the
student's online profile in Blue Mountain.38 2
Judge Chagares expressly disagreed with the majority that the School
could reasonably forecast a substantial disruption merely because the
content involved statements about the principal's sexual behavior, 383
especially because no one took the outrageous profile seriously.3 8 The
principal even agreed the profile did not make accusations about him.385 If
no one took the profile seriously, it is not reasonable to forecast a
substantial disruption based on the prediction the school will need to
alleviate the worry of parents as to the principal's fitness for his job.
Second, the majority conflated Fraser and Tinker.386  While the
majority asserted it relied on the vulgar nature of the language as a factor
to support a finding of a reasonable forecast of a substantial disruption,'3
the dissent noted the majority's analysis "sounds like an application of the
Fraser standard rather than the Tinker standard."388 Because the majority
emphasized the vulgar nature of the profile several times, 38 9 the dissent was
379. See id. at 315-16.
380. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969).
381. Blue Mountain, 593 F.3d at 315 (Chagares, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
382. Id. at 316 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514).
383. Id.
384. Id. at 315 (citation omitted).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 303 (majority opinion) (stating that "based on the profile's nature
and its threat of substantial disruption of the [school]" environment, the School District
did not violate the student's First Amendment rights (emphasis added)).
387. Id. at 301 n.8 (rejecting the dissent's characterization, the majority
conflated Fraser and Morse by arguing vulgarity is one reason why a reasonable
forecast of a substantial disruption exists).
388. Id. at 317 (Chagares, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
389. Id. at 301 (majority opinion) ("We thus cannot overlook the context of
2010] 155
Drake Law Review
rightfully concerned this focus on the vulgarity of online student speech
would "allow the Fraser exception to swallow the Tinker rule."39 0 Whereas
the district court appeared to engage in an unfaithful Fraser analysis-or at
least expanded Fraser-by allowing the School to punish the student for
off-campus speech, a majority of the Blue Mountain appellate panel
appeared to engage in a less-than-faithful application of Tinker to reach an
outcome-determinative result.391
In dissent, Judge Chagares concluded Fraser does not apply to online,
off-campus speech.39 "Fraser's 'lewdness' standard cannot be extended to
justify a school's punishment of J.S. for the use of profane language outside
the school, during non-school hours." 393 Thus, Judge Chagares would have
reversed summary judgment in favor of the School and granted the
student's summary judgment motion because the School violated the
student's First Amendment rights when it asserted jurisdiction over his
online, off-campus speech.394 Combining Judge Chagares's Blue Mountain
dissent with the Layshock panel,395 at least four judges in the Third Circuit
find Fraser inapplicable to online, off-campus speech. The pending en bac
consolidated cases of Layshock and Blue Mountain should provide further
insight on the Third Circuit's overall First Amendment jurisprudence in the
context of online student speech rights.
3. The Court that Got It Right
On the same day the Blue Mountain Court declined to consider
whether Fraser applies to online, off-campus speech, another Third Circuit
panel comprised of different judges unanimously affirmed in Layshock v.
the lewd and vulgar language contained in the profile, especially in light of the inherent
potential of the Internet to allow rapid dissemination of information."); id. at 308
("[A]llud[ing] to [the principal's] interest or engagement in sexually inappropriate
behavior and illegal conduct . . . threatened to substantially disrupt the [school] . . . .");
id. ("[Tihe Constitution allows school officials the ability to regulate student speech,
where, as here, it reaches beyond mere criticism to significantly undermine a school
official's authority in challenging his fitness to hold a position by means of baseless,
lewd, vulgar, and offensive language.").
390. Id. at 317 (Chagares, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
391. See id. (arguing the majority applied "the Fraser standard rather than the
Tinker standard").
392. Id. at 317-18.
393. Id. at 318.
394. Id. at 318-19.
395. Layschock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. Feb. 4,
2010), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 07-4465 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
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Hermitage School District that Fraser does not apply to online, off-campus
speech.39 6
In Layshock, a student, Justin Layshock, created a parody profile of
his high school principal on MySpace.39 7  The profile contained some
offensive statements such as "big whore" and "big fag."3 98 The student
created this parody profile at his grandmother's home during nonschool
hours and invited other students to view it by sending them online
invitations to be "friends" of the parody profile. 399 Other students then
created and posted similar parody profiles of the principal on MySpace.400
All of these other profiles were "more vulgar and more offensive than"
Layshock's parody profile. 401
The school learned of Layshock's profile only after another student-
the principal's daughter-brought one of the other profiles to the attention
of the school principal. 402  Upon discovery of the profile, the school
suspended Layshock for ten days because the online speech included
vulgar and harassing language about the principal.403 Although the district
court denied the student's motion for a temporary restraining order, it
subsequently granted summary judgment in his favor because no
substantial disruption occurred on campus.404 In analyzing the School's
claim that Fraser applied due to the nature of the website content, the court
expressly found Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech: "[B]ecause
Fraser involved speech expressed during an in-school assembly, it does not
expand the authority of schools to punish lewd and profane off-campus
speech. "405
On appeal, the Layshock panel unanimously affirmed the district
court.40 6 At oral argument, the School District's counsel conceded it relied
solely on the creation of the online profile as the basis for punishing the
396. Id.
397. Id. at 252.
398. Id. at 252-53.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 253.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 254.
404. Id. at 255, 258.
405. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599 (W.D. Pa.
2007), aff'd, 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 07-
4465 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
406. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 264-65.
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student.407 In analyzing whether Fraser applies to online, off-campus
speech, the court followed the Third Circuit's Saxe precedent, relied on the
Supreme Court's Morse decision, and adopted the Second Circuit's
rationale in Thomas for limiting school jurisdiction over off-campus
speech. 408 First, the court found Saxe clearly applies only to in-school
speech.409 Second, the court cited the Morse dicta acknowledging the limits
of Fraser.410
Finally, the Layshock court relied on rationale in the Second Circuit's
Thomas decision. Thomas reasoned a court's deference to a school's
incursion on a student's First Amendment rights "'rests, in large measure,
upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach beyond the
schoolhouse gate."' 4 11  Thomas did not permit school jurisdiction over
students that published an offensive, off-campus magazine even though
students occasionally wrote articles on campus and a teacher allowed them
to store copies of the magazine in a classroom closet.4 12 The Layshock
Court found the School's assertion of jurisdiction over an online, off-
campus profile "far more attenuated than in Thomas" and found the school
does not have jurisdiction over the student's online, off-campus speech.413
To hold otherwise "would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent" that
allows schools to expand their jurisdiction over free speech rights beyond
the schoolhouse gate.414
While Layshock and Blue Mountain did not create an explicit intra-
circuit conflict, the conflation of Fraser and Tinker in Blue Mountain and
the conflicting result in Layshock left the disarray and uncertainty as to the
limits of school jurisdiction over online speech that existed before these
cases. Will vulgar or offensive, online speech always create a foreseeable
risk of a substantial disruption, even when no actual substantial disruption
407. Id. at 263.
408. Id. at 260-63.
409. Id. at 261 n.16.
410. Id. at 260 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403-04 (2007)); see
supra Part II.A.
411. Id. at 263 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir.
1979)).
412. See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1052-53.
413. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 260 ("Here, the relationship between Justin's
conduct and the school is far more attenuated than in Thomas, and we will not allow
the School District to stretch its authority so far that it reaches Justin while he is sitting
in his grandmother's home after school.").
414. Id.
158 [Vol. 59
Online Student Speech and the First Amendment
occurs? If the en banc panel in these consolidated cases follows the
reasoning in Blue Mountain that found a reasonable forecast of a
substantial disruption based merely on the vulgar nature of the speech,
then online student speech could be punished-even when the parties
agree no actual substantial disruption occurred. 415 Layshock alone does
not preclude this outcome because it distinguished cases in which courts
found a reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption based on online, off-
campus speech. 416 Thus, the en banc consolidated rehearing should be
helpful in clarifying the Third Circuit's jurisprudence concerning online
student speech rights.
In the en banc consolidated rehearing in the Third Circuit, as well as
in Doninger in the Second Circuit, these courts can clarify this uncertainty
by both creating a bright-line rule that Fraser does not apply to online
speech and by not resorting to tortured applications of Tinker to reach an
outcome-determinative result that restricts First Amendment free speech
rights merely because speech is vulgar or offensive. As set forth above,
caselaw shows a faithful application of Fraser does not create school
jurisdiction over online speech-regardless of whether it is created or
accessed on or off campus-because there is no captive audience and no
need for a school to disassociate itself from the speech.
IV. SELF-REALIZATION THEORY AND STUDENT SPEECH
Not only does existing legal doctrine show Fraser is inapplicable to
online speech, a normative principle underlying this legal rule is self-
realization. Generally, speech is important in and of itself because it helps
define who we are as individuals.417  Specifically, Martin Redish's
articulation of self-realization theory influences this analysis of online
speech because it creates a unified theory of the First Amendment and
helps protect against further erosion of students' First Amendment rights
caused by schools' unwarranted expansiont of jurisdiction into
cyberspace. 418
415. See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 298-99 (3d Cir. Feb. 4,
2010), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
416. See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 261-63. Although Layshock did not mention
Blue Mountain, it distinguished Bethlehem, Wisniewski, and Doninger because those
cases ostensibly found an actual substantial disruption or a reasonably foreseeable one.
See id. (citations omitted).
417. See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 54, at 17 (noting speech helps form a
person's personal and social identities).
418. Redish, supra note 44, at 594 (concluding "all forms of expression that
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According to Redish, all free speech theories derive from the
underlying premise that speech is important to an individual's personal
development and ability to control one's own destiny.419 Self-realization is
the umbrella theory other First Amendment theories serve. If one accepts
Redish's view, one need not reject the marketplace of ideas, the democratic
process, individual autonomy, or other theories of the First Amendment.420
They are "subvalues" that all serve self-realization.421  Self-realization
includes the right to receive and engage in speech that is of little or no
value, such as indecent or offensive speech.422  Unification of First
Amendment theory is important because it allows valuable First
Amendment theories to maintain legitimacy and usefulness in our First
Amendment jurisprudence. Individual development depends upon several
free speech values and the self-realization theory allows multiple First
Amendment theories to coexist peacefully. 423
A. Self-Realization Theory in Supreme Court Caselaw
Self-realization theory has played an influential role in the Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, if not its holdings. Self-
realization theory in Supreme Court caselaw stems from Justice Brandeis's
1927 concurring opinion in Whitney v. California.4 24 At least one
further the self-realization value . . . are deserving of full constitutional protection"
(emphasis added)).
419. See id. at 593.
420. Id. at 594; see DON R. PEMBER & CLAY CALVERT, MASS MEDIA LAw 42-
47 (2009-2010 ed. 2008) (reviewing First Amendment theories including the absolutist
theory, ad hoc balancing theory, preferred position balancing theory, access theory,
and Meiklejohnian theory).
421. Redish, supra note 44, at 594.
422. Id. at 627-28 ("If two consenting individuals wish to engage in a
conversation consisting of little more than a stream of obscenities, assuming no harm to
others, it is dangerous to provide the state with the power to prohibit such activity on
the ground that such discourse is not 'valuable."' (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971))); see also N. Douglas Wells, Thurgood Marshall and "Individual Self-
Realization" in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 61 TENN. L. REV. 237, 271 (1993)
("Protection of expression which is indecent or sexually explicit is wholly supportable
as advancing the self-realization value.").
423. See Redish, supra note 44, at 625 ("Once one recognizes that the primary
value of free speech is as a means of fostering individual development and aiding the
making of life-affecting decisions, the inappropriateness of distinguishing between the
value of different types of speech becomes clear.").
424. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); see Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1183 (3d Cir.
1986) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) ("Professor Emerson expressed the same thought [as
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commentator posits that Justice Thurgood Marshall's First Amendment
jurisprudence exhibits an application of self-realization theory similar to
that of Redish, with self-realization at the top of a hierarchy of free speech
values and other free speech values being "subservient or derivative." 425
Most recently, Justice Stevens invoked self-realization in his dissenting
opinion in Citizens United v. FCC and specifically cited Redish. 42 6 Self-
realization theory arises in a variety of contexts, including student speech.
The invocation of this theory in a variety of contexts lends support to the
position that self-realization is the umbrella theory under which various
First Amendment subvalues arise and, further, that this theory applies to
minors.
In Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, Justice
Marshall relied on self-realization theory to support Mosley's right to
engage in peaceful picketing on the sidewalk in front of a high school,
regardless of the subject matter. 427  Mosley picketed the high school
because it practiced "black discrimination." 428 A Chicago city ordinance
prohibited all peaceful picketing within 150 feet of school buildings during
school hours, except peaceful picketing involving a school labor dispute.429
In holding the Chicago ordinance unconstitutional, Justice Marshall wrote:
"To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure
self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to
Justice Brandeis in Whitney] when he wrote that freedom of expression is essential as a
means of assuring individual self-realization." (citing THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 6 (1970))); Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-
Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 444-45, n.7 (1998) (discussing how
the self-realization theory has its Supreme Court roots in Justice Brandeis's concurring
opinion in Whitney was explicitly referenced in Justice Marshall's opinion in Police
Department v. Mosley, and influenced Justice Souter's opinion in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group).
425. Wells, supra note 422, at 240 (analyzing opinions written by Justice
Marshall in a variety of free speech contexts to show he followed self-realization
theory).
426. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing free speech "facilitates the value of 'individual
self-realization"' (quoting Redish, supra note 44, at 594)).
427. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). The Court analyzed
the ordinance under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it differentiated between labor picketing and other peaceful picketing, but it
acknowledged the claim was "closely intertwined" with the First Amendment. Id.
428. Id. at 93.
429. Id. at 94.
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express any thought, free from government censorship. "430
While the Court acknowledged the city's legitimate interest in
preventing school disruption, it quoted Tinker for the position that
"'undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression."' 431 The Court recognized
the proximity of Mosley's speech to the school had an intended purpose-
to affect the school's practices-and this purpose would be negated under
the ordinance's 150-foot-perimeter requirement. 432 Mosley illustrates the
existence of self-realization theory in Supreme Court caselaw and provides
support for limiting school jurisdiction over off-campus speech, even when
that speech is intended to affect the school. Mosley's guidance-speech
intended to affect the school environment receives First Amendment
protection-is important when considering the arguments made by the
school districts in Layshock,433 Blue Mountain,434 and Doninger.43 5 The
school districts argue they have the right to regulate offensive online, off-
campus speech when it "reach[es] the school campus and com[es] to the
attention of school officials," 436 has a "sufficient nexus" to the campus,437 or
has "an effect on the school and the educational mission of the District." 438
These arguments are insufficient to allow schools jurisdiction over
offensive, online student speech. Indeed, Tinker's substantial-disruption
test proves such arguments fail, and the Fraser exception logically cannot
apply to online speech absent a captive audience.
Eighteen years after Mosley, Justice Marshall cited Mosley in his
430. Id. at 95-96.
431. Id. at 100-01 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 508 (1969)). Because the ordinance permitted peaceful picketing on labor
disputes, the Court reasoned the city itself had determined peaceful picketing does not
substantially disrupt the school. Id.
432. Id. at 93 n.1. The Court quoted Mosley's testimony from the lower court
hearing where he testified, "'[W]hen I was across the street from the school, 150 feet
away, you cannot hardly see me."' Id. In other words, that speech can-and is
intended to-have an effect on a school does not equate to substantial disruption. This
point undercuts the argument that schools can regulate online, off-campus speech
meant to be present on campus or have an effect on campus.
433. See Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee, supra note 36, at 28-29.
434. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 36, at 19-24.
435. Supplemental Response and Reply Brief of Defendants-
Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 157, at 16-18.
436. Id. at 22.
437. Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee, supra note 36, at 13.
438. Brief of Appellee, supra note 36, at 7.
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concurring opinion in Board of Education of the Westside Community
Schools v. Mergens.439 Mergens involved the rights of a religious student
club at an Omaha, Nebraska, high school to meet on campus." 0 The Court
held the Equal Access Act"1 prohibited the school from denying a
Christian club the right to meet on school premises during noninstructional
time because it permitted nonreligious clubs to hold such meetings.442
Mergens is particularly applicable to student speech rights because,
according to Justice Marshall, "That the Constitution requires toleration of
speech over its suppression is no less true in our Nation's schools."4 3 This
comment by Justice Marshall both supports the rule that schools cannot
punish offensive online speech that is created or accessed on campus and
highlights another subvalue of the self-realization theory-toleration of
speech." 4 Even if school administrators find vulgar online parody profiles
or being called "douchebags" in a dispute about rescheduling a musical
439. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 262 (1990) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (citing Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)).
440. Id. at 262-63.
441. Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (2006).
442. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247. Because the Court ruled on statutory grounds,
it expressly refrained from deciding whether the First Amendment requires the same
result. Id. A plurality, however, did express their belief that the high school's action
did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 247-48 (plurality opinion). The
plurality relied primarily on Widmar v. Vincent. Id. at 248 (citing Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 271-75 (1981)). In Widmar, the Court held a state university regulation
violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because the regulation did
not provide equal access to university facilities for religious worship and teaching when
it provided such access for other student uses. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265, 269. Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, did not join the plurality in Mergens because they
believed the plurality's reliance on Widmar was misplaced and such reliance raised
serious Establishment Clause concerns. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 266 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Justice Marshall's concern arose from the high school's failure to
disassociate itself from the club's activities. Id. at 266. Justice Stevens's dissenting
opinion also concluded Widmar was not analogous. Id. at 273 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens found Widmar inapplicable because the forum -involved in that case was
materially different than the forum in the Omaha high school. Id. These analyses,
however, do not negatively impact the position of this Article because, unlike in the
case of a school club, there is no risk schools will be associated with the off-campus
speech of students.
443. Id. at 263 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
444. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 164-65 (1986); cf TOMAIN, supra note
50, at 121 ("In modern liberal democracies committed to tolerance of a variety of
religious, moral, and political points of view, there can be no single viewpoint that can
or should take precedence over others.").
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festival offensive, that reaction does not create jurisdiction over online
speech. Schools must tolerate offensive, online speech, just as citizens
tolerate a lot of "shabby" speech the First Amendment protects."5
Self-realization theory arose in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, a case involving broadcasters' rights to
refuse editorial advertisements.446 The Democratic National Committee
argued broadcasters violated either the Federal Communications Act of
1934 or the First Amendment when they refused to accept editorial
advertisements.4 The Court held that broadcasters need not accept
editorial advertisements under the public-interest requirement of the
Federal Communications Act."8 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan
cited Mosley as support for requiring broadcasters to accept some editorial
advertisements.449
Justice Brennan stated, "[I]t is imperative that we take special care to
preserve the vital First Amendment interest in assuring 'self-fulfillment [of
expression] for each individual."' 45 0 Justice Brennan's reliance on self-
realization provides support for the Fraser rule articulated here in two
ways. First, an overarching value of the First Amendment is protecting an
individual's ability to develop and control her own destiny, and this
includes students.45 1 Second, this opinion, expressed in 1972, presciently
recognized that protecting self-realization through speech rights in
"electronic media" is essential in our "age of technology. "452
445. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000).
The point, however, is not to categorize speech of religious clubs as "shabby." Rather,
the point is the First Amendment requires citizens to tolerate speech in many
instances.
446. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
193 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
447. Id. at 97-98 (plurality opinion).
448. Id. at 130-31. The Court's First Amendment analysis resulted in dicta
because only a plurality found broadcast licensees could not be viewed as state actors.
Id. at 120-21. This Article takes no position on.whether this case reached the correct
holding in analyzing the public interest requirements of broadcasters under the Federal
Communications Act of 1934. The purpose of citing this case is to show self-realization
theory plays a role in our Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.
449. Id. at 198-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
450. Id. at 193 (quoting Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
451. Id. ("But freedom of speech does not exist in the abstract. On the
contrary, the right to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an effective
forum-whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a
radio and television frequency." (emphasis added)).
452. Id. at 201 ("The First Amendment values of individual self-fulfillment
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Jistice White invoked self-realization theory in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, a case involving the rights of corporations and banks to
make political expenditures.453  In Bellotti, the majority held that a
Massachusetts criminal law prohibiting banks and corporations from
making expenditures on referenda not materially affecting their respective
businesses violated the First Amendment rights of these business entities.454
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White acknowledged that corporations do
possess some First Amendment rights, but he asserted they are not
coextensive with the First Amendment rights of individuals. 45 5 The opinion
stated, "Indeed, what some have considered to be the principal function of
the First Amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-
expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at all furthered by
corporate speech." 45 6 Although a narrow majority of the Court continues
to eviscerate Justice White's position on corporate speech,457 self-
realizati6n theory remains alive in Supreme Court caselaw. 458  Self-
realization is no less important to children than to adults. When a junior
class secretary uses an online forum to communicate with taxpayers about
the possible cancellation of a public school music festival, her use of the
through expression and individual participation in public debate are central to our
concept of liberty. If these values are to survive in the age of technology, it is essential
that individuals be permitted at least some opportunity to express their views on public
issues over the electronic media.").
453. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-05 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting).
454. Id. at 767 (majority opinion).
455. Id. at 804 (White, J., dissenting) ("There is now little doubt that corporate
communications come within the scope of the First Amendment. This, however, is
merely the starting point of analysis, because an examination of the First Amendment
values that corporate expression furthers and the threat to the functioning of a free
society it is capable of posing reveals that it is not fungible with communications
emanating from individuals and is subject to restrictions which individual expression is
not.").
456. Id. at 804-05 (citations omitted).
457. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). Not only did
Citizens United undercut Justice White's analysis in Bellotti, it misinterpreted the
limited scope of Bellotti and relied on this misinterpretation to reach its holding. Id. at
958 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The only thing about
Bellotti that could not be clearer is that it declined to adopt the majority's position.
Bellotti ruled, in an explicit limitation on the scope of its holding, that 'our
consideration of a corporation's right to speak on issues of general public interest
implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation in a political
campaign for election to public office."' (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26)).
458. See id. at 972.
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term "douchebag" does not justify violating her First Amendment rights.
In Branzburg v. Hayes, the majority held that requiring journalists to
appear and testify before grand juries does not violate the First
Amendment rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.459
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, however, recognized that a free and
vibrant press helps "enhance" self-realization. 460 Justice Stewart's use of
self-realization theory in the context of press freedom is consistent with the
Student Press Law Center's concern that extending Fraser to online
student speech "poses a serious threat to the First Amendment rights of
student journalists."461 Thus, the rule advanced here protects more than
offensive, juvenile speech; it also protects political speech and student press
freedom.
Finally, self-realization theory appeared in Justice Marshall's
concurrence in Procunier v. Martinez, a case involving' inmate
correspondence. 462  The Director of the California Department of
Corrections promulgated rules that allowed censorship of correspondence
where inmates "'unduly complain,' "'magnify grievances,"' or write
"'inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views."463 The majority
459. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
460. Id. at 726-27 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Not only does the press enhance
personal self-fulfillment by providing the people with the widest possible range of fact
and opinion, but it also is an incontestable precondition of self-government.").
461. Brief of Amicus Curiae Student Press Law Center in Support of Plaintiff-
Appellee-Cross-Appellant, supra note 39, at 1.
462. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427-28 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
concurring), overruled in part by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989).
Martinez required intermediate-scrutiny analysis regarding the right of prison officials
to censor inmate correspondence. Id. at 413-14. Under Thornburgh, Martinez now
applies only to outgoing mail from inmates, and the right of prison officials to censor
incoming mail to inmates is subject to a reasonableness standard. Thornburgh, 490
U.S. at 413. Specifically, prison officials may censor incoming mail to inmates if it is
"'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."' Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). In support of distinguishing between incoming and outgoing
inmate correspondence, the Court reasoned, "The implications of outgoing
correspondence for prison security are of a categorically lesser magnitude than the
implications of incoming materials." Id. Martinez supports the contention that
nonstudents have a right to receive online communications from students, and by
punishing students for offensive online speech that does not cause a substantial
disruption of the school environment, schools violate these nonstudents' First
Amendment rights.
463. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 399 (quoting regulations promulgated by the
Director of the California Department of Corrections).
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held these correspondence rules violated the First Amendment because
they failed to further a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression.464 The majority based its decision on First
Amendment rights generally, not inmates' rights.465 The correspondence
rules violated the rights of non-inmates to receive speech. 466 Although the
majority opinion focused on First Amendment rights generally, Justice
Marshall's concurring opinion reached the issue of prisoners' rights.467
Justice Marshall expressly recognized an individual's "quest for self-
realization" does not end "when the prison gates slam behind" the
prisoner. 468 Similarly, a student's quest for self-realization does not end
when the student steps through the schoolhouse gates or steps into
cyberspace.
Schools restrict more than just students' rights when they assert
jurisdiction over online speech. Just as the Martinez Court considered the
impact on non-inmates' free speech and associational rights when it held
inmate correspondence rules violated the First Amendment, courts
considering students' online free speech rights must also consider how
school jurisdiction over online speech restricts the rights of nonstudents.4 69
When a school seeks to punish a student for online speech that requests
taxpayers and citizens contact the school to save a school music festival, the
school violates the rights of the taxpayers and citizens, as well as those of
the student.
Collectively, these cases demonstrate the Supreme Court has
considered self-realization theory in the contexts of picketing in front of
high schools, student clubs, parades, public-interest requirements on
broadcasters, corporate speech, the reporter's privilege, and inmate
correspondence. Lower courts have also incorporated self-realization
theory in caselaw. 47 0
464. Id. at 415.
465. Id. at 409.
466. Id. at 408-09.
467. Id. at 422-28 (Marshall, J., concurring).
468. Id. at 428.
469. See id. at 409 (majority opinion).
470. See Moore v. City of Kilgore, Tex., 877 F.2d 364, 379 (5th Cir. 1989). The
Fifth Circuit cited self-realization as perhaps having some role in our First Amendment
jurisprudence when it held the city violated a firefighter's First Amendment rights by
disciplining him for making comments to the press about staffing problems after one
fireman died of a heart attack and another suffered serious injuries in a fire. Id.
Traditionally, "free speech is protected because it has values; it springs from
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Although self-realization theory mostly appears in concurring or
dissenting opinions and is not the dominant First Amendment theory,
majorities' theories change as time progresses. History shows today's
dissent may become tomorrow's majority opinion.47 1 Citizens United shows
Redish's vision of self-realization remains influential in our Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. 472  As Justice Brennan noted,
dissents are more than pleas. 473  Dissents preserve the integrity of the
judicial process by holding the majority accountable for their decisions.474
Further, they provide a mechanism for dialogue to occur across time and
thereby facilitate the revision of law when visions of forward-thinkers of
the age of enlightment out of which the spirit of the American Revolution
came. The values include truth-seeking and knowledge-advancement, as a
societal object, as well as to a lesser degree perhaps, self-fulfillment on the part
of the individual speaker [autonomy and individual dignity]."
Id. (quoting James L. Oakes, Tolerance Theory and the First Amendment, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1135, 1137 (1987)). See also Grossart v. Dinaso, 758 F.2d 1221, 1231 (7th Cir.
1985) ("A functioning democracy and individual self-realization within such a political
system require free expression."); Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d
246, 272 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) ("While the 'market place of
ideas' justification for unrestricted speech is the most consistently applied, other
justifications for unrestricted speech are also persuasive. As Professor Emerson has
suggested, unrestricted speech is inextricably bound up in an individual's search for
self-fulfillment and truth." (citing THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970))); Johnson v. Fed. Express Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1276
(M.D. Ala. 2001) ("The First Amendment fundamentally protects individual self-
realization."); Gordon v. Griffith, 88 F. Supp. 2d 38, 40-42 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding a
state legislator did not violate the First Amendment rights of a former political aide
after firing her for comments the aide made about police brutality, but recognizing
"[clonsiderations of personal fulfillment also support freedom to speak" (citing Curtis
Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1967) (plurality opinion))); Skyywalker Records,
Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 584 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("Free speech plays a critical role
in furthering self-government, in encouraging individual self-realization, and fostering
society's search for truth via exposure to a 'marketplace of ideas."'), rev'd, Luke
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 130 (11th Cir. 1992).
471. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis's Right to Privacy, 45
BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 645-46 (2007) (discussing how a majority of the Court adopted
Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), almost four
decades later in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
472. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting free speech "facilitates the value of 'individual self-realization"' (citing Redish,
supra note 44, at 594)).
473. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 430
(1986).
474. Id.
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the past become mainstream views of the present. 47 5 Self-realization theory
has played a role in the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence-as well as in the lower courts'-and provides a normative
basis for the rule articulated here.
B. Self-Realization Theory in the Context of Student Speech
Self-realization theory is particularly appropriate in the context of
student speech. In Chess v. Widmar, for example, the Eighth Circuit held
that a public university violated the Establishment Clause by excluding
religious groups from conducting religious activities in university-owned
buildings that were open for use by nonreligious student groups. 47 6 The
court began its opinion by referencing a university policy that expressly
cited "self-realization" as one benefit of student organizations. 477 Chess is
consistent with Mergens-a case involving a high school-in prohibiting
schools from discriminating against religious groups when schools allow
nonreligious groups to use the same school facilities to conduct meetings.478
Taken together, Chess and Mergens show self-realization is important to
both high school and college students.
If we desire a society in which children grow up equipped to make
life-affecting decisions and develop as individuals, they must be allowed to
exercise their First Amendment rights outside the schoolhouse gate and in
cyberspace. To be sure, students' free speech rights are not unlimited. A
minor cannot purchase pornography, though he can view it with parental
consent.479  A student cannot give an "offensively lewd and indecent"
speech before a mandatory school assembly,48 0 though he can give the same
speech outside the school environment.481 A school can punish a student
for the on-campus conduct of surreptitiously video-recording his teacher's
475. Id. at 437 ("Because we Justices of the United States Supreme Court are
the last word on the meaning of the Constitution, our views must be subject to revision
over time, or the Constitution falls captive to the anachronistic views of long-gone
generations."); Wells, supra note 422, at 287 (discussing Justice Brennan's In Defense
of Dissent article, and commenting that "as new Justices are appointed to the Court,
perhaps some will come to regard the paths urged by Justice Marshall's First
Amendment jurisprudence as wise guidance").
476. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1320 (8th Cir. 1980), affd, Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
477. Id. at 1312 n.1.
478. See id. at 1313; Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990).
479. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,639 (1968).
480. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
481. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404-05 (2007).
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buttocks in class while another student makes pelvic-thrusting gestures
behind her back, but the school cannot punish the student for posting the
video online.482
Certainly, deciding whether to treat students as adults or as children
is a delicate task at times.483 Both self-realization theory and free speech
rights have limits in the context of minors, 484 as well as adults.485 The
purpose of this Article is to emphasize the importance of minimizing
limitations on students' free speech rights by providing a bright-line rule
that prohibits school jurisdiction over Fraser-type student speech in
cyberspace. Constitutional precedent supports this rule, even when taking
account of the unique considerations involved in analyzing student speech.
Historically, our youth have played an important role in exercising
"subvalues" of the First Amendment.486 Mary Beth Tinker and others
engaged in democratic participation when they protested the Vietnam War
by wearing black armbands at school, but this is not the only example of
students engaging in political speech and realizing their ability to effect
societal change. At a 2009 symposium on Tinker, Mary Beth reflected on
several examples of students realizing their ability and exercising their right
to effect change through speech and action.48" Mary Beth cited "Claudette
Colvin, a fifteen-year-old black student in Montgomery, Alabama, [who]
refused to give up her seat on a bus" as an example of a minor exercising
her free speech rights in furtherance of democracy.48 Recent examples of
482. Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1283 (W.D. Wash.
2007).
483. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 275 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The need to decide
whether to risk treating students as adults too soon, or alternatively to risk treating
them as children too long, is an enduring problem for all educators.").
484. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 64 (1976)
(plurality opinion) ("'[T]o assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are
guaranteed the right to express any thought free from government censorship."'
(quoting Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972))). Despite self-realization
and free speech concerns, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting adult movie
theatres from being within 1,000 feet of a school. Id. at 72-73.
485. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("In its usual application . . . the First Amendment protects important
values of individual expression and personal self-fulfillment."). But, the Court upheld
a prison rule limiting press access to inmates for face-to-face interviews because "these
individualistic values of the First Amendment are not directly implicated." Id.
486. Redish, supra note 44, at 594.
487. See Mary Beth Tinker, Foreword: Reflections on Tinker, 58 AM. U. L.
REV. 1119 (2009).
488. Id. at 1122 (noting Rosa Parks, who later "had her own sit-down strike,"
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students engaging in democratic participation directly related to education
include: (1) students protesting an Arizona law banning ethnic studies in
public schools489 and (2) students using a social networking website to
organize a school walkout in protest of New Jersey's education budget
cuts. 490 Students play an important role in exercising free speech rights, and
these rights should be protected because they help fulfill youths'
development of self-realization. 491
While democratic participation is important, it is not the only
"subvalue" of self-realization. The First Amendment also protects lower-
value speech, as evidenced by Justice Marshall's dissent in Fraser.4 92 Justice
Marshall dissented because Fraser's speech, filled with sexual innuendo,
did not substantially disrupt the school environment.493 That dissent does
not mean Justice Marshall applauded Fraser's speech. Rather, his dissent
shows the self-realization theory protects a wide range of speech from
government regulation and does not rest on the value of the speech to
society or the democratic process.494
The importance of self-realization theory increases in the online
context because of the power cyberspace provides individuals to receive
and express speech. In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court recognized
Internet content "'is as diverse as human thought,"' content regulation is
likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas, and "[t]he interest in
encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any
worked at the NAACP office that took Colvin's case).
489. Amy Goodman, Arizona Students Protest New Law Banning Ethnic
Studies Classes, DEMOCRACY Now! (May 14, 2010), http://www.democracynow.org/
2010/5/14/arizonastudents-protest new law banning.
490. Winnie Hu, In New Jersey, a Civics Lesson in the Internet Age, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/nyregion/
28jersey.html?.
491. See Papandrea, supra note 34, at 1077 ("[Pjolitical arguments minors
make can have much more influence on the democratic process than other forms of
adult speech that receive full constitutional protection . . . ." (citing Emily Buss,
Constitutional Fidelity Through Children's Rights, 2004 Sup. CT. REV. 355, 380)).
Although Papandrea discussed free speech rights under a democratic process theory,
this argument is consistent with a self-realization argument because the democratic
process is one "subvalue" of the self-realization theory.
492. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 690 (1986)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
493. See id.
494. See Wells, supra note 422, at 260-61 (discussing Justice Marshall's dissent
as evidence of his use of self-realization theory in First Amendment jurisprudence).
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theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship." 4 95 Reno is particularly
relevant to the rule articulated here for four reasons.
First, Reno held that the Internet is a medium that receives "'the
highest protection from governmental intrusion."' 496 Reno weighs against
school jurisdiction over online student speech. Second, the Court held that
the challenged provisions of the Communication Decency Act seeking to
prohibit the transmission of "indecent" material to persons under eighteen
were overbroad. 497 The holding in Reno indicated the Court will tolerate
speech that could potentially be harmful to minors when assessing First
Amendment rights.498 Third, like Martinez, Reno recognized the rights of
others to receive speech and held that the challenged provisions violated
the rights of adults to receive constitutionally protected speech. 499 Finally,
in Reno, Justice O'Connor cited Ginsberg v. New York as support for the
decision.500 In Ginsberg, the Court upheld a ban on the sale of "girlie"
magazines to minors under seventeen years old because "the prohibition
against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing
the magazines for their children." 01 Unlike the statute in Ginsberg, the
challenged provisions of the Communications Decency Act invaded the
rights of parents to allow their children to receive protected speech,
including speech that some may find inappropriate for minors.502 Thus,
Reno provides support on several levels for prohibiting school jurisdiction
over online, Fraser-type speech, and it is consistent with self-realization
theory because the decision allows individuals to decide whether to create
or receive speech that may reasonably be considered of little or no value
and recognizes the importance of robust First Amendment protection for
online speech. 503
Scholars and psychologists note that individuals, especially youth,
experiment with and form identity in online interactions 5 " This individual
495. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852, 885 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
496. Id. at 863 (quoting Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883 (Dalzell, J., concurring)).
497. Id. at 884-85.
498. See id.
499. See id. at 876.
500. Id. at 889 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634 (1968)).
501. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629, 631, 639.
502. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 878.
503. See id. at 867.
504. See, e.g., PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 54, at 3-6; Papandrea, supra
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experimentation and development is harmed when schools impose
punishments for online speech. Online activity is difficult, if not
impossible, to separate from the lives of today's youth. The First
Amendment protects offensive speech. 05 This legal protection does not
mean no consequences result from offensive speech, but allowing schools
to restrict online free speech rights teaches the wrong lesson. Law is not
the only force that shapes individual behavior" and it "is rarely the right
answer." 0 Social norms also regulate behavior.508 Punishing students for
exercising constitutional rights is not as beneficial as educating students
that discretion is the better part of valor and legal does not inherently
equal right.509  Moreover, sometimes schools punish constitutionally
protected speech,510 and this error is problematic even if a court later
remedies the First Amendment violation because "[t]he loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury.""
note 34, at 1030; Brad Stone, The Children of Cyberspace: Old Fogies by Their 20s,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, at WK5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10
/weekinreview/10stone.html?_r1.
505. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 44 (1973) (discussing protections for
offensive publications).
506. Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw
Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507-09 (1999) (stating four modalities-law,
social norms, markets, and architecture-regulate our behavior in real space and
cyberspace).
507. PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 54, at 12 ("The law is rarely the right
answer, but we should not hesitate to use it when it could do more good than harm.").
Using the law to punish offensive online speech would do more harm than good
because such speech, without more, is constitutionally protected. Schools cannot be
permitted to expand their jurisdiction over online speech merely because it is offensive,
lewd, or indecent.
508. Lessig, supra note 506, at 507.
509. Papandrea, supra note 34, at 1098 ("[T]he primary approach that schools
should take to most digital speech is not to punish their students, but to educate their
students about how to use digital media responsibly.").
510. See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 260-63 (3d Cir.
Feb. 4, 2010), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 07-4465 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010); see
also supra Part III.A-B (discussing the application of Fraser and progeny).
511. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)); accord Barber v. Dearborn Pub. Sch.,
286 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849, 858-59 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding a school prohibiting a
student from wearing a T-shirt with then-President George W. Bush's photograph and
the phrase, "International Terrorist," to school likely violated the student's First
Amendment rights and "may well constitute irreparable harm").
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Not only can schools punish speech that may be constitutionally
protected, the punishments can be extreme.5 12  Excessive school
punishments for online student speech are too common to ignore. 13 For
this analysis, cases applying either Tinker or Fraser provide relevant
examples. A divided Eighth Circuit en banc panel upheld the expulsion of
a student based on two letters he wrote at home that only made it onto
school grounds because a friend stole the letters from his house and
brought them to school.514 The Second Circuit upheld the one-semester
suspension of a student based on an online drawing of his teacher being
shot, even though both a police investigator and psychologist believed the
student created this online, off-campus drawing as a joke without violent
intent or actual threat.515
In Mahaffey v. Aldrich, the principal recommended expulsion for a
student who contributed to a website created by another student entitled
"Satan's web page."516 Although the website mentioned killing people, it
also stated the website had no purpose and contained the disclaimer:
"NOW THAT YOU'VE READ MY WEB PAGE PLEASE DON'T GO
KILLING PEOPLE AND STUFF THEN BLAMING IT ON ME.
OK?" 17 In Coy v. Board of Education of North Canton City Schools, the
school expelled a student for a website he created at home, which,
according to the court, had little objectionable content. 18 In M.K. v. Three
512. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781-83 (E.D. Mich.
2002) (considering a challenge from a student who contributed to, and may have used
school computers to help create, a website called "Satan's web page," which stated
"[s]chool sucks," and who was subsequently suspended and recommended for
expulsion).
513. See id.; see also M.K. v. Three Rivers Local Sch. Dist., No. 1:07CV1011, at
2-3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 2007) (order granting temporary restraining order) (noting the
school district suspended the students for ten days and expelled them for an additional
eighty days).
514. Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 619-20, 627 (8th Cir.
2002) (en banc).
515. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 36, 40 (2d Cir. 2007).
516. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 781-82. The First Amendment claim was
validated because the evidence failed to establish the website was disruptive to the
school or created on school property. Id. at 786, 790. The court cited Justice
Brennan's concurrence in Fraser as support for the position that schools cannot punish
off-campus speech simply because it could punish similar speech during a school
assembly. Id. at 784 n.3 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688-89
(1986) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
517. Id. at 782.
518. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 795 (N.D. Ohio 2002) ("Most
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Rivers Local School District, the school expelled three students for eighty
days based on a parody profile they created of one of their teachers that
listed "Pedophile" as the response to a question about the teacher's
position at the school.519
Justice Brennan most likely would have found these punishments
unconstitutional. In Fraser, the school suspended Fraser for three days-
he served two-and precluded him from speaking at graduation.5 2 0 Justice
Brennan considered this punishment "somewhat severe." 52 1 Imagine how
Brennan would describe the punishments in the preceding cases.
"Draconian" is one possible way to describe them. 522
To be clear, school administrators may not be acting in an
intentionally malicious way. Administrators may truly believe they are
acting in the best interests of the school and the students. Regardless, this
good faith belief does not overcome human nature,523 especially when the
school administrator has a natural inclination to protect the school and its
administrators from unsavory speech.524 The problem of biased decision
making is compounded when school administrators who are the targets of
online speech are also the individuals that make decisions on whether and
how severely to punish a student-their judgment may be clouded by the
objectionable was a sentence describing one boy as being sexually aroused by his
mother.").
519. M.K. v. Three Rivers Local Sch. Dist., No. 1:07CV1011, at 2 (S.D. Ohio
Dec. 28, 2007) (order granting temporary restraining order).
520. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678-79 (majority opinion).
521. Id. at 690 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
522. Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 635 (8th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("The board's draconian punishment is
unprecedented among the school threat cases across the nation.").
523. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally
alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.").
524. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[A school
official's] intimate association with the school itself and his understandable desire to
preserve institutional decorum give him a vested interest in suppressing controversy.
Accordingly, '[u]nder the guise of beneficent concern for the welfare of school
children, school authorities, albeit unwittingly, might permit prejudices of the
community to prevail."' (quoting James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir.
1972))).
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content aimed at them. 525 Because a school administrator is both
"prosecutor and judge" 526 when punishing student speech, as well as the
alleged injured party in many instances, there are valid reasons for limiting
their jurisdiction over online student speech. First, they may punish
protected speech. Second, even if they punish unprotected speech, the
excessive punishments noted above provide a supporting normative reason
to limit school jurisdiction over online student speech.
While this Article advocates for strong protection against school
jurisdiction over online speech, it recognizes society's legitimate and
reasonable concerns about the content of much of the speech at issue in
these cases. Schools are not without power. Schools can and do limit
access to Internet activity at school by utilizing school computer-use
policies or blocking access to certain websites. Parents can and do limit
access as well. School administrators may bring individual defamation
actions,5 27 contact the police for concerns about possible true threats, or
notify parents if they have concerns about student speech activity that may
not be punishable under Fraser, Tinker, or other student speech
doctrines.528 Moreover, schools can use examples of unkind Internet
activity to teach students about the possibility of negative consequences
accompanying such activity, even though the activity is ultimately legally
permissible. The solution, however, is to refrain from punishing online
speech, especially merely offensive speech, when it does not cause a
substantial disruption or cannot be fully considered a true threat.
525. See id. at 1048 ("We recognize the realities of life. Thus, when those
charged with evaluating expression have a vested interest in its regulation, the
temptation to expand the otherwise precise and narrow boundaries of punishable
speech may prove irresistible.").
526. Id. at 1051.
527. The principal in Layshock did bring a defamation suit against Layshock
and three other students based on the content of the parody profiles. Trosch v.
Layshock, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/trosch-
v-layshock (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (providing information on this defamation
lawsuit). The principal dismissed his claims against all of the students except Layshock.
Id.
528. Papandrea, supra note 34, at 1100-01 (restricting school jurisdiction over
online student speech does not leave schools powerless or save students from criminal
prosecution or civil liability under appropriate circumstances); see also Danielle Keats
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 62-63 (2009) (analyzing the possibility
of civil rights claims arising from online speech).
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V. CONCLUSION
Accepting Fraser as a legitimate regulation of student speech within
the schoolhouse gate restricts the First Amendment constitutional rights of
students. Erring in favor of students' constitutional rights over asserted
claims of the need to maintain order and discipline within a school-
particularly in light of the extreme punishments often imposed by schools
regarding online student speech-leads to the conclusion that concerns
surface when an authority asserts jurisdiction in cyberspace to restrict the
constitutional right to free speech.
If First Amendment protection is at its "zenith" off campus,529 it must
also be at its zenith in cyberspace where the First Amendment deserves the
highest degree of government protection.530 While the Supreme Court has
not addressed whether Fraser or any other student speech test applies
online or outside school or school-sponsored events, trends in the lower
courts allow school jurisdiction over online speech. 531 This trend violates
the constitutional rights of students. The Third Circuit's holding in
529. Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050 ("[B]ecause school officials have ventured out
of the school yard and into the general community where the freedom accorded
expression is at its zenith, their actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind
government officials in the public arena.").
530. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
531. See, e.g., J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir. Feb.
4, 2010) (upholding a school's punishment of a student who created a MySpace profile
for her principal that included "profanity-laced statements insinuating that he was a sex
addict and pedophile"), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 08-4138 (3d Cir. Apr. 9,
2010); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 2007) (allowing a school to
suspend an eighth-grade student for sharing, via the Internet, a drawing that depicted a
teacher being shot); Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1273-74
(W.D. Wash. 2007) (upholding the suspension of a student who helped create and
distribute a video showing a teacher's buttocks). But cf. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 251-53 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010) (affirming the district court's finding a
student who created an online profile of his principal was not within the school),
vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 07-4465 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010); Flaherty v. Keystone
Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (finding the school did not
have jurisdiction over a student who posted messages about a school volleyball game
on an Internet message board); Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (E.D.
Mich. 2002) (holding the school's "regulation of [the student's] speech on [a Satanism]
website without any proof of disruption to the school or on campus activity in the
creation of the website was a violation of [the student's] First Amendment rights");
Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089-90 (W.D. Wash. 2000)
(enjoining a school from suspending a student who created an "unofficial" homepage
for the school from his home computer because he did not have a captive audience in
the school environment).
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Layshock, which found that Fraser does not apply to online, off-campus
speech,53 2 was a step in the right direction because it robustly protects First
Amendment rights by creating a bright-line rule limiting school's
jurisdiction over online student speech. With the consolidated en banc
rehearing of Layshock and Blue Mountain, the Third Circuit has an
excellent opportunity to set a strong precedent that protects students' free
speech rights. Such a result would be consistent with then-Circuit Judge
Alito's strong protection of such rights in the Third Circuit's Saxe decision,
as well as his concurrence in Morse. The Second Circuit has a second
chance to address Fraser in the context of online student speech rights
based on the certified question pending before it in Doninger. Further, a
recent decision by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida helps stem the tide of schools asserting jurisdiction over
online, off-campus Fraser-type speech."33 This jurisdictional limitation,
however, should not be limited to off-campus speech.
Absent a substantial disruption, schools do not have jurisdiction over
offensive online speech, regardless of whether it is created or accessed on
or off campus.53 To hold otherwise violates First Amendment rights and
provides school officials with too much discretion to punish speech.53 5 This
rule is consistent with factors in Fraser, which makes it an exception to
Tinker.53 6 Because a logical application of Fraser supports this rule,
determining schools have no jurisdiction over offensive online speech
represents an incremental and sound first step into the development of
student-speech doctrine in cyberspace. More complicated questions, such
as if and when Tinker applies to online, off-campus speech, may wisely
come next, after a foundation has been laid under Fraser.
Expanding school jurisdiction to cover online, Fraser-type speech
would merely address the symptoms and not the causes of offensive
532. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 263.
533. See Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1371-74 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
(denying a high school principal's motion to dismiss a student's claim that the school
violated her First Amendment rights when it suspended her from school and removed
her from the advanced placement classes because of comments she made on a social
networking website).
534. See Papandrea, supra note 34, at 1069-70.
535. See id. at 1070 ("The idea that schools could regulate offensive speech on
the Internet without showing any harm to the school would give school officials almost
limitless authority to police their students' expression.").
536. Id.
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juvenile speech.537 The costs of allowing schools to expand jurisdiction
over online, Fraser-type speech are heavy because: (1) we risk losing
important speech,538 as was the case in Doninger;539 (2) we allow self-
interested, nonimpartial decision makers to issue punishments that may be
excessive, as was the case in Layshock and M.K. v. Three Rivers Local
School District;540 and (3) we erode students' understanding of the
importance of free speech in our constitutional structure and in their
individual quests for self-realization. 541 Thus, the judiciary should hold
537. See, e.g., Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 631 (8th
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("Today's teenagers witness, experience,
and hear violence on television, in music, in movies, in video games, and for some, in
abusive relationships at home. It is hardly surprising that such violence is reflected in
the way they express themselves and communicate with their peers, particularly where
adult supervision is lacking."). Further, offensive juvenile speech may simply be a fact
of life for some youth as they develop, mature, and form their respective identities.
Schools may educate students about the negative effects of such speech, but they may
not impose punishment when such speech occurs online.
538. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Indeed,
we have granted First Amendment protection to much speech of questionable worth,
rather than force potential speakers to determine at their peril if words are embraced
within the protected zone. To avoid the chilling effect that inexorably produces a
silence born of fear, we have been intentionally frugal in exposing expression to
government regulation.").
539. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 211 (D. Conn. 2007)
(finding the student had adequately established a chilling effect sufficient to show
irreparable harm), aff'd, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
540. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. Feb. 4,
2010) (affirming a grant of summary judgment to a student suspended for a MySpace
profile), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, No. 07-4465 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010); M.K. v.
Three Rivers Local Sch. Dist., No. 1:07CV1011, at 4-8 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 2007) (order
granting temporary restraining order) (enjoining a school district from enforcing the
remainder of an expulsion for an offensive Facebook profile); see also Thomas, 607
F.2d at 1051 ("It is not difficult to imagine the lengths to which school authorities could
take the power they have exercised in the case before us."). The court in Thomas was
referring to a school that punished students for publishing and distributing a lewd and
indecent satirical magazine off campus. The dangers of school jurisdiction over
offensive, online speech are exponentially increased because of the accessibility of
online content regardless of geographic location. Contrary to arguments made by
school officials, offensive, online speech deserves more protection from expansive
school jurisdiction, not less. See supra Part IV.B.
541. See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1047 ("Embodied in our democracy is the firm
conviction that wisdom and justice are most likely to prevail in public decisionmaking if
all ideas, discoveries, and points of view are before the citizenry for its consideration.
Accordingly, we must remain profoundly skeptical of government claims that state
action affecting expression can survive constitutional objections." (citations omitted)).
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Fraser does not apply to online speech, and it must exercise closer scrutiny
when schools punish student speech because the judiciary is "the one
institution of government intentionally designed to render dispassionatejustice." 542
542. Id. at 1048 (citations omitted); see Papandrea, supra note 34, at 1067
("Unfortunately, most courts that apply the Tinker standard are far too deferential to
the schools' claims that the speech at issue caused a reasonable fear of a substantial
disruption." (citations omitted)).
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